The White House  白宫

April 2, 2025

PURSUING RECIPROCITY TO REBUILD THE ECONOMY AND RESTORE NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC SECURITY: Today, President Donald J. Trump declared that foreign trade and economic practices have created a national emergency, and his order imposes responsive tariffs to strengthen the international economic position of the United States and protect American workers.
追求互惠以重建经济并恢复国家和经济安全： 今天，唐纳德·J·特朗普总统宣布，对外贸易和经济行为已造成国家紧急状态，他的命令实施响应性关税，以加强美国的国际经济地位并保护美国工人。

• Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits have led to the hollowing out of our manufacturing base; resulted in a lack of incentive to increase advanced domestic manufacturing capacity; undermined critical supply chains; and rendered our defense-industrial base dependent on foreign adversaries.
  美国每年持续存在的巨大商品贸易逆差，导致我国制造业基础空心化；导致我们缺乏提高国内先进制造业产能的动力；破坏了关键的供应链；并使得我们的国防工业基础依赖外国对手。
• President Trump is invoking his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) to address the national emergency posed by the large and persistent trade deficit that is driven by the absence of reciprocity in our trade relationships and other harmful policies like currency manipulation and exorbitant value-added taxes (VAT) perpetuated by other countries.
  特朗普总统援引 1977 年《国际紧急经济权力法》（IEEPA）赋予的权力，应对由巨大且持续的贸易逆差所造成的国家紧急状态，这种贸易逆差的产生源于我们的贸易关系中缺乏互惠，以及其他国家实施的货币操纵和高额增值税（VAT）等有害政策。
• Using his IEEPA authority, President Trump will impose a 10% tariff on all countries.
  特朗普总统将利用其 IEEPA 权力对所有国家征收 10%的关税。
  • This will take effect April 5, 2025 at 12:01 a.m. EDT.
    此政策将于 2025 年 4 月 5 日美国东部时间凌晨 12:01 生效。
• President Trump will impose an individualized reciprocal higher tariff on the countries with which the United States has the largest trade deficits. All other countries will continue to be subject to the original 10% tariff baseline.
  特朗普总统将对美国贸易逆差最大的国家征收个别互惠更高关税。所有其他国家将继续遵守原有的 10% 关税基准。
  • This will take effect April 9, 2025 at 12:01 a.m. EDT.
    此政策将于 2025 年 4 月 9 日美国东部时间凌晨 12:01 生效。
• These tariffs will remain in effect until such a time as President Trump determines that the threat posed by the trade deficit and underlying nonreciprocal treatment is satisfied, resolved, or mitigated.
  这些关税将一直有效，直到特朗普总统确定贸易逆差和潜在的非互惠待遇所带来的威胁得到消除、解决或缓解为止。
• Today’s IEEPA Order also contains modification authority, allowing President Trump to increase the tariff if trading partners retaliate or decrease the tariffs if trading partners take significant steps to remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and align with the United States on economic and national security matters.
  今天的 IEEPA 命令还包含修改权，允许特朗普总统在贸易伙伴进行报复时提高关税，或者在贸易伙伴采取重大措施纠正非互惠贸易安排并在经济和国家安全问题上与美国保持一致时降低关税。
• Some goods will not be subject to the Reciprocal Tariff. These include: (1) articles subject to 50 USC 1702(b); (2) steel/aluminum articles and autos/auto parts already subject to Section 232 tariffs; (3) copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and lumber articles; (4) all articles that may become subject to future Section 232 tariffs; (5) bullion; and (6) energy and other certain minerals that are not available in the United States.
  某些商品不受互惠关税约束。这些商品包括：(1) 受 50 USC 1702(b) 约束的商品；(2) 已受第 232 条关税约束的钢/铝制品和汽车/汽车零部件；(3) 铜、药品、半导体和木材制品；(4) 所有可能受未来第 232 条关税约束的商品；(5) 金银；(6) 美国没有的能源和其他某些矿物。
• For Canada and Mexico, the existing fentanyl/migration IEEPA orders remain in effect, and are unaffected by this order. This means USMCA compliant goods will continue to see a 0% tariff, non-USMCA compliant goods will see a 25% tariff, and non-USMCA compliant energy and potash will see a 10% tariff. In the event the existing fentanyl/migration IEEPA orders are terminated, USMCA compliant goods would continue to receive preferential treatment, while non-USMCA compliant goods would be subject to a 12% reciprocal tariff.
  对于加拿大和墨西哥，现有的芬太尼/移民 IEEPA 令仍然有效，不受本令影响。这意味着符合 USMCA 的商品将继续享受 0% 的关税，不符合 USMCA 的商品将享受 25% 的关税，不符合 USMCA 的能源和钾肥将享受 10% 的关税。如果现有的芬太尼/移民 IEEPA 令终止，符合 USMCA 的商品将继续享受优惠待遇，而不符合 USMCA 的商品将享受 12% 的互惠关税。

 
TAKING BACK OUR ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY: President Trump refuses to let the United States be taken advantage of and believes that tariffs are necessary to ensure fair trade, protect American workers, and reduce the trade deficit—this is an emergency.
夺回我们的经济主权： 特朗普总统拒绝让美国被利用，并认为关税对于确保公平贸易、保护美国工人和减少贸易逆差是必要的——这是一个紧急情况。

• He is the first President in modern history to stand strong for hardworking Americans by asking other countries to follow the golden rule on trade: Treat us like we treat you.
  他是现代历史上第一位坚决维护勤劳的美国人利益的总统，他要求其他国家遵守贸易的黄金法则：我们对待你们就像我们对待我们一样。
• Pernicious economic policies and practices of our trading partners undermine our ability to produce essential goods for the public and the military, threatening national security.
  我们的贸易伙伴的恶劣经济政策和做法破坏了我们为公众和军队生产必需品的能力，威胁着国家安全。
• U.S. companies, according to internal estimates, pay over $200 billion per year in value-added taxes (VAT) to foreign governments—a “double-whammy” on U.S. companies who pay the tax at the European border, while European companies don’t pay tax to the United States on the income from their exports to the U.S.
  据内部估计，美国公司每年向外国政府缴纳超过 2000 亿美元的增值税（VAT）——这对在美国边境缴税的美国公司来说是“双重打击”，而欧洲公司无需就其对美出口收入向美国纳税
• The annual cost to the U.S. economy of counterfeit goods, pirated software, and theft of trade secrets is between $225 billion and $600 billion. Counterfeit products not only pose a significant risk to U.S. competitiveness, but also threaten the security, health, and safety of Americans, with the global trade in counterfeit pharmaceuticals estimated at $4.4 billion and linked to the distribution of deadly fentanyl-laced drugs.
  假冒商品、盗版软件和商业机密窃取每年给美国经济造成的损失高达 2250 亿美元至 6000 亿美元。假冒产品不仅对美国的竞争力构成重大风险，还威胁美国人的安全、健康和保障，全球假冒药品贸易额估计为 44 亿美元，并且与致命的芬太尼类药物的分销有关。
  • This imbalance has fueled a large and persistent trade deficit in both industrial and agricultural goods, led to offshoring of our manufacturing base, empowered non-market economies like China, and hurt America’s middle class and small towns. 
    这种不平衡导致了工业品和农产品贸易长期存在巨大逆差，导致美国制造业基地转移到海外，增强了中国等非市场经济体的力量，并损害了美国的中产阶级和小城镇。
  • President Biden squandered the agricultural trade surplus inherited from President Trump’s first term, turning it into a projected all-time high deficit of $49 billion.
    拜登总统挥霍了特朗普总统第一任期继承的农业贸易顺差，将其变成了预计将达到 490 亿美元的历史最高赤字。
• The current global trading order allows those using unfair trade practices to get ahead, while those playing by the rules get left behind.
  当前的全球贸易秩序让那些采取不公平贸易行为的人获得成功，而那些遵守规则的人却被抛在后面。
• In 2024, our trade deficit in goods exceeded $1.2 trillion—an unsustainable crisis ignored by prior leadership.
  2024年，我们的商品贸易逆差超过1.2万亿美元——这是前任领导层忽视的难以承受的危机。
• “Made in America” is not just a tagline—it’s an economic and national security priority of this Administration. The President’s reciprocal trade agenda means better-paying American jobs making beautiful American-made cars, appliances, and other goods.
  “美国制造”不仅仅是一句口号，更是本届政府的经济和国家安全重点。总统的互惠贸易议程意味着，美国将创造薪酬更高的就业机会，生产出精美的美国制造的汽车、家电和其他商品。
• These tariffs seek to address the injustices of global trade, re-shore manufacturing, and drive economic growth for the American people.
  这些关税旨在解决全球贸易的不公平问题、将制造业转移回美国并推动美国经济增长。
• Reciprocal trade is America First trade because it increases our competitive edge, protects our sovereignty, and strengthens our national and economic security.
  互惠贸易是美国优先的贸易，因为它增强了我们的竞争优势，保护了我​​们的主权，加强了我们的国家和经济安全。
• These tariffs adjust for the unfairness of ongoing international trade practices, balance our chronic goods trade deficit, provide an incentive for re-shoring production to the United States, and provide our foreign trading partners with an opportunity to rebalance their trade relationships with the United States.
  这些关税针对当前国际贸易行为的不公平性进行了调整，平衡了我们长期存在的商品贸易逆差，激励生产回流美国，并为我们的外国贸易伙伴提供了重新平衡与美国贸易关系的机会。

 
REPRIORITIZING U.S. MANUFACTURING: President Trump recognizes that increasing domestic manufacturing is critical to U.S. national security.
重新调整美国制造业的优先顺序： 特朗普总统认识到增加国内制造业对美国国家安全至关重要。

• In 2023, U.S. manufacturing output as a share of global manufacturing output was 17.4%, down from 28.4% in 2001.
  2023年，美国制造业产出占全球制造业产出的比重为17.4%，低于2001年的28.4%。
• The decline in manufacturing output has reduced U.S. manufacturing capacity.
  制造业产出的下降导致美国制造产能降低。
  • The need to maintain a resilient domestic manufacturing capacity is particularly acute in advanced sectors like autos, shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, transport equipment, technology products, machine tools, and basic and fabricated metals, where loss of capacity could permanently weaken U.S. competitiveness.
    保持国内制造能力的弹性需求在汽车、造船、制药、运输设备、技术产品、机床以及基础金属和制成品等先进行业中尤为迫切，因为这些行业的产能损失可能会永久削弱美国的竞争力。
• U.S. stockpiles of military goods are too low to be compatible with U.S. national defense interests.
  美国军用物资库存过低，不符合美国国防利益。
  • If the U.S. wishes to maintain an effective security umbrella to defend its citizens and homeland, as well as allies and partners, it needs to have a large upstream manufacturing and goods-producing ecosystem.
    如果美国希望维持有效的安全保护伞来保卫其公民和国土以及盟友和伙伴，它需要拥有庞大的上游制造和商品生产生态系统。
  • This includes developing new manufacturing technologies in critical sectors like bio-manufacturing, batteries, and microelectronics to support defense needs.
    这包括在生物制造、电池和微电子等关键领域开发新制造技术以支持国防需求。
• Increased reliance on foreign producers for goods has left the U.S. supply chain vulnerable to geopolitical disruption and supply shocks.
  对外国生产商的商品依赖性增加导致美国供应链容易受到地缘政治干扰和供应冲击。
  • This vulnerability was exposed during the COVID-19 pandemic, and later with Houthi attacks on Middle East shipping.
    这一弱点在新冠肺炎疫情期间以及随后胡塞武装袭击中东航运时暴露无遗。
• From 1997 to 2024, the U.S. lost around 5 million manufacturing jobs and experienced one of the largest drops in manufacturing employment in history.
  从1997年到2024年，美国失去了约500万个制造业岗位，经历了历史上最大的制造业就业降幅之一。

 
ADDRESSING TRADE IMBALANCES: President Trump is working to level the playing field for American businesses and workers by confronting the unfair tariff disparities and non-tariff barriers imposed by other countries.
解决贸易不平衡问题： 特朗普总统正在努力通过应对其他国家施加的不公平关税差距和非关税壁垒，为美国企业和工人创造公平的竞争环境。

• For generations, countries have taken advantage of the United States, tariffing us at higher rates. For example:
  几代以来，各国一直利用美国，对我们征收更高的关税。例如：
  • The United States imposes a 2.5% tariff on passenger vehicle imports (with internal combustion engines), while the European Union (10%) and India (70%) impose much higher duties on the same product. 
    美国对乘用车进口（带内燃机）征收2.5％的关税，而欧盟（10％）和印度（70％）对同一产品征收的关税要高得多。
  • For networking switches and routers, the United States imposes a 0% tariff, but India (10-20%) levies higher rates.
    对于网络交换机和路由器，美国征收0％的关税，但印度（10-20％）征收更高的税率。
  • Brazil (18%) and Indonesia (30%) impose a higher tariff on ethanol than does the United States (2.5%). 
    巴西（18%）和印度尼西亚（30%）对乙醇征收的关税高于美国（2.5%）。
  • For rice in the husk, the U.S. imposes a tariff of 2.7%, while India (80%), Malaysia (40%), and Turkey (31%) impose higher rates. 
    对于带壳大米，美国征收2.7％的关税，而印度（80％）、马来西亚（40％）和土耳其（31％）征收的关税税率更高。
  • Apples enter the United States duty-free, but not so in Turkey (60.3%) and India (50%).
    苹果免税进入美国，但土耳其（60.3%）和印度（50%）的情况却并非如此。
• The United States has one of the lowest simple average most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff rates in the world at 3.3%, while many of our key trading partners like Brazil (11.2%), China (7.5%), the European Union (5%), India (17%), and Vietnam (9.4%) have simple average MFN tariff rates that are significantly higher.
  美国拥有世界上最低的简单平均最惠国关税税率之一，为3.3%，而我们的许多主要贸易伙伴，如巴西（11.2%）、中国（7.5%）、欧盟（5%）、印度（17%）和越南（9.4%）的简单平均最惠国关税税率却高得多。
• Similarly, non-tariff barriers—meant to limit the quantity of imports/exports and protect domestic industries—also deprive U.S. manufacturers of reciprocal access to markets around the world. For example:
  同样，旨在限制进出口数量和保护国内产业的非关税壁垒也剥夺了美国制造商进入全球市场的机会。例如：
  • China’s non-market policies and practices have given China global dominance in key manufacturing industries, decimating U.S. industry. Between 2001 and 2018, these practices contributed to the loss of 3.7 million U.S. jobs due to the growth of the U.S.-China trade deficit, displacing workers and undermining American competitiveness while threatening U.S. economic and national security by increasing our reliance on foreign-controlled supply chains for critical industries as well as everyday goods.
    中国的非市场政策和做法使中国在全球关键制造业占据主导地位，重创美国工业。2001 年至 2018 年间，这些做法导致美国因中美贸易逆差扩大而损失 370 万个就业岗位，导致工人失业，削弱美国竞争力，同时通过增加对外国控制的关键行业和日常用品供应链的依赖，威胁美国经济和国家安全。
  • India imposes their own uniquely burdensome and/or duplicative testing and certification requirements in sectors such as chemicals, telecom products, and medical devices that make it difficult or costly for American companies to sell their products in India. If these barriers were removed, it is estimated that U.S. exports would increase by at least $5.3 billion annually.
    印度在化学品、电信产品和医疗设备等领域实施了独特的繁重和/或重复的测试和认证要求，这使得美国公司在印度销售产品变得困难或成本高昂。如果这些障碍被消除，据估计，美国出口每年将增加至少 53 亿美元。
  • Countries including China, Germany, Japan, and South Korea have pursued policies that suppress the domestic consumption power of their own citizens to artificially boost the competitiveness of their export products. Such policies include regressive tax systems, low or unenforced penalties for environmental degradation, and policies intended to suppress worker wages relative to productivity.
    包括中国、德国、日本和韩国在内的一些国家都推行了抑制本国公民国内消费能力的政策，以人为地提高其出口产品的竞争力。这些政策包括累退税制、对环境恶化的惩罚力度低或不强制执行，以及旨在压低工人工资与生产率的政策。
  • Certain countries, like Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Vietnam, restrict or prohibit the importation of remanufactured goods, restricting market access for U.S. exporters while also stifling efforts to promote sustainability by discouraging trade in like-new and resource-efficient products. If these barriers were removed, it is estimated that U.S. exports would increase by at least $18 billion annually.
    阿根廷、巴西、厄瓜多尔和越南等某些国家限制或禁止进口再制造商品，这不仅限制了美国出口商的市场准入，还通过阻止类似新产品和资源节约型产品的贸易，阻碍了促进可持续发展的努力。如果这些壁垒被消除，据估计，美国出口每年将增加至少 180 亿美元。
  • The UK maintains non-science-based standards that severely restrict U.S. exports of safe, high-quality beef and poultry products.
    英国坚持非科学的标准，严重限制了美国安全、高品质牛肉和家禽产品的出口。
  • Indonesia maintains local content requirements across a broad range of sectors, complex import licensing regimes, and, starting this year, will require natural resource firms to onshore all export revenue for transactions worth $250,000 or more.
    印尼对多个行业都实行本地内容要求，并设立了复杂的进口许可制度，并且从今年开始，要求自然资源公司将所有价值 25 万美元或以上的出口收入转为本地收入。
  • Argentina has banned imports of U.S. live cattle since 2002 due to unsubstantiated concerns regarding bovine spongiform encephalopathy.  The United States has a $223 million trade deficit with Argentina in beef and beef products.
    由于对牛海绵状脑病的担忧毫无根据，阿根廷自 2002 年以来禁止进口美国活牛。美国与阿根廷在牛肉和牛肉制品方面的贸易逆差高达 2.23 亿美元。
  • For decades, South Africa has imposed animal health restrictions that are not scientifically justified on U.S. pork products, permitting a very limited list of U.S. pork exports to enter South Africa. South Africa also heavily restricts U.S. poultry exports through high tariffs, anti-dumping duties, and unjustified animal health restrictions. These barriers have contributed to a 78% decline in U.S. poultry exports to South Africa, from $89 million in 2019 to $19 million 2024.
    几十年来，南非对美国猪肉产品实施了没有科学依据的动物健康限制，允许非常有限的美国猪肉出口进入南非。南非还通过高关税、反倾销税和不合理的动物健康限制严格限制美国家禽出口。这些壁垒导致美国对南非的家禽出口下降了 78%，从 2019 年的 8900 万美元下降到 2024 年的 1900 万美元。
  • U.S. automakers face a variety of non-tariff barriers that impede access to the Japanese and Korean automotive markets, including non-acceptance of certain U.S. standards, duplicative testing and certification requirements, and transparency issues. Due to these non-reciprocal practices, the U.S. automotive industry loses out on an additional $13.5 billion in annual exports to Japan and access to a larger import market share in Korea—all while the U.S. trade deficit with Korea more than tripled from 2019 to 2024.
    美国汽车制造商面临各种非关税壁垒，阻碍其进入日本和韩国汽车市场，包括不接受某些美国标准、重复测试和认证要求以及透明度问题。由于这些不互惠的做法，美国汽车行业每年对日本的出口额增加了 135 亿美元，并且失去了在韩国获得更大进口市场份额的机会——与此同时，美国对韩国的贸易逆差从 2019 年到 2024 年增加了两倍多。
• Monetary tariffs and non-monetary tariffs are two distinct types of trade barriers that governments use to regulate imports and exports. President Trump is countering both through reciprocal tariffs to protect American workers and industries from these unfair practices.
  货币关税和非货币关税是政府用来管制进出口的两种不同类型的贸易壁垒。特朗普总统通过互惠关税来应对这两种贸易壁垒，以保护美国工人和产业免受这些不公平做法的影响。

 
THE GOLDEN RULE FOR OUR GOLDEN AGE: Today’s action simply asks other countries to treat us like we treat them. It’s the Golden Rule for Our Golden Age.
我们黄金时代的黄金法则： 今天的行动只是要求其他国家像我们对待他们一样对待我们。这是我们黄金时代的黄金法则。

• Access to the American market is a privilege, not a right.
  进入美国市场是一项特权，而非权利。
• The United States will no longer put itself last on matters of international trade in exchange for empty promises.
  美国将不再在国际贸易问题上把自己置于最后，以换取空洞的承诺。
• Reciprocal tariffs are a big part of why Americans voted for President Trump—it was a cornerstone of his campaign from the start.
  互惠关税是美国人投票支持特朗普总统的重要原因之一——从一开始它就是他竞选的基石。
  • Everyone knew he’d push for them once he got back in office; it’s exactly what he promised, and it’s a key reason he won the election.
    每个人都知道，一旦他重返办公室，他就会努力推动这些目标；这正是他所承诺的，也是他赢得选举的一个关键原因。
• These tariffs are central to President Trump’s plan to reverse the economic damage left by President Biden and put America on a path to a new golden age.
  这些关税是特朗普总统扭转拜登总统留下的经济损失、让美国走上新黄金时代道路的计划的核心。
  • This builds on his broader economic agenda of energy competitiveness, tax cuts, no tax on tips, no tax on Social Security benefits, and deregulation to boost American prosperity.
    这是以他更广泛的经济议程为基础的，包括能源竞争力、减税、小费免税、社会保障福利免税以及放松管制以促进美国繁荣。

 
TARIFFS WORK: Studies have repeatedly shown that tariffs can be an effective tool for reducing or eliminating threats that impair U.S. national security and achieving economic and strategic objectives.
关税有效： 研究一再表明，关税可以成为减少或消除损害美国国家安全的威胁以及实现经济和战略目标的有效工具。

• A 2024 study on the effects of President Trump’s tariffs in his first term found that they “strengthened the U.S. economy” and “led to significant reshoring” in industries like manufacturing and steel production.
  2024 年的一项关于特朗普总统第一任期内关税影响的研究发现，关税“增强了美国经济”并“导致制造业和钢铁生产等行业大规模回流”。
• A 2023 report by the U.S. International Trade Commission that analyzed the effects of Section 232 and 301 tariffs on more than $300 billion of U.S. imports found that the tariffs reduced imports from China and effectively stimulated more U.S. production of the tariffed goods, with very minor effects on prices.
  美国国际贸易委员会2023年的一份报告分析了第232和301条款关税对3000多亿美元美国进口产品的影响，发现关税减少了从中国的进口，有效刺激了美国对被关税商品的更多生产，对价格的影响却很小。
• According to the Economic Policy Institute, the tariffs implemented by President Trump during his first term “clearly show[ed] no correlation with inflation” and only had a temporary effect on overall price levels.
  经济政策研究所称，特朗普总统第一任期内实施的关税“显然与通胀没有关联”，对整体价格水平只产生了暂时的影响。
• An analysis from the Atlantic Council found that “tariffs would create new incentives for US consumers to buy US-made products.”
  大西洋理事会的分析发现，“关税将为美国消费者购买美国制造的产品创造新的激励”。
• Former Biden Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen affirmed last year that tariffs do not raise prices: “I don’t believe that American consumers will see any meaningful increase in the prices that they face.”
  拜登前财政部长珍妮特·耶伦去年确认关税不会提高价格：“我不相信美国消费者会看到他们面临的价格出现任何有意义的上涨。”
• A 2024 economic analysis found that a global tariff of 10% would grow the economy by $728 billion, create 2.8 million jobs, and increase real household incomes by 5.7%.
  2024 年的经济分析发现，全球 10% 的关税将使经济增长 7280 亿美元，创造 280 万个就业岗位，并让实际家庭收入增加 5.7%。