Founder, CIO Mentor, and Member of the Bridgewater Board
创始人、首席信息官导师、桥水董事会成员
2024年3月28日
A few years ago, President Xi Jinping started warning that a 100-year big storm is coming. As is typical of the early days of a hurricane, one can now feel it. The circumstances and the mood in China have indisputably changed to become more threatening. These changes are mostly due to big cycle forces.
几年前，习近平主席就开始警告说，一场百年不遇的大风暴即将来临。正如典型的飓风初期一样，人们现在可以感受到它的到来。中国的环境和情绪无可争议地发生了变化，变得更具威胁性。这些变化主要是大周期力量造成的。
The most joyous and productive environments are ones that have freedom, civility, and creativity, and ones in which people can make their dreams into great realities with prosperity that is shared by most people. This happened in China from around 1980 until around five years ago. It is quite typical for such booms to produce debt bubbles and big wealth gaps that lead the booms to turn into bubbles that turn into busts. That happened in China at the same time as the global great power conflict intensified, so China is now in the post-bubble and great power conflict part of the Big Cycle that is driven by the five big forces that have changed the mood and the environment. In this piece, I will first describe in brief how the Big Cycle has transpired over roughly the past century, and then I will explain the current picture of what is happening today, with a focus on the challenges that China is facing. This history and these dynamics are complex and important to world history and the global order—everything I write here is how I see it based on my own experience, relationships, and research.
最快乐、最富有成效的环境是拥有自由、文明和创造力的环境，是人们能够将梦想变为伟大现实的环境，是大多数人共享繁荣的环境。从 1980 年左右到大约五年前，中国就出现了这种情况。这种繁荣通常会产生债务泡沫和巨大的贫富差距，从而导致繁荣变成泡沫，再变成萧条。这种情况在中国发生的同时，全球大国冲突也在加剧，因此，中国现在正处于大周期的后泡沫和大国冲突阶段，这是由改变了情绪和环境的五大力量所驱动的。在这篇文章中，我将首先简要描述大周期在过去大约一个世纪中的发展过程，然后解释今天的现状，重点是中国面临的挑战。这段历史和这些动态对于世界历史和全球秩序是复杂而重要的--我在这里所写的一切都是我根据自己的经验、关系和研究得出的看法。
How the Big Cycle in China Transpired to Create the Conditions from the Beginning of the PRC Through the Current Conditions
从建国之初到现在，中国的大循环是如何创造条件的？
- In the 1930-45 period, there was the last 100-year big storm, which was driven classically by the confluence of 1) a debt bust that triggered a global depression, 2) a civil war in China between the rich rightist-capitalists and the poor leftist-communists (which ended in 1949 when the Communists won), 3) an international great power conflict-war that ended in 1945 when the United States (and, to a much lesser extent, Great Britain and Russia) won, creating the American-led world order, 4) many disruptive acts of nature, and 5) big technological changes. That period ended in the classic ways they end, with a debt and economic collapse, one side winning over the other in the great international war and the new world order beginning (in 1945), and one side winning over the other in the civil war and the new domestic order beginning (in 1949).
在 1930-45 年期间，发生了上一个百年大风暴，其经典驱动因素包括：1）债务危机引发全球大萧条；2）中国富裕的右派资本家与贫穷的左派共产党之间的内战（1949 年共产党获胜，内战结束）、3）国际大国冲突战争，1945 年以美国（其次是英国和俄罗斯）获胜而告终，建立了以美国为首的世界秩序；4）许多破坏性的自然事件；5）巨大的技术变革。这一时期以典型的方式结束：债务和经济崩溃，一方在国际大战中战胜另一方，新的世界秩序开始（1945 年），一方在内战中战胜另一方，新的国内秩序开始（1949 年）。 - From 1949 (the year the new domestic order was created via the PRC being formed) until 1978 (the year Deng Xiaoping came to power), there was a typical post-war consolidation period led by Mao in the way he wanted via a domestic economic policy that was communist, a domestic political policy that was oppressive (dictatorial and designed to purge the opposition), and a foreign policy that was isolationist. That and big disruptive acts of nature led to many big challenges and big bad periods and few economic and technological advances. Mao and that era died in 1976.
从 1949 年（中华人民共和国成立，建立了新的国内秩序）到 1978 年（邓小平上台），毛泽东按照他所希望的方式，通过共产主义的国内经济政策、高压（独裁和旨在清除反对派）的国内政治政策和孤立主义的外交政策，领导了一个典型的战后巩固时期。这和大自然的破坏性行为导致了许多大的挑战和大的糟糕时期，经济和技术进步寥寥无几。毛泽东和那个时代在 1976 年消亡了。 - When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he reduced the one-man control and repressions, increased collective leadership, replaced hardcore autocratic communism with more free markets and increasingly larger doses of capitalism, and opened China up to foreigners to learn and earn from them. It was like sprinkling water on fertile ground that led to a great blossoming. From 1978 until Xi came to power, there was a classic capitalist rejuvenation that led to a boom in which the economy, living standards, and debt all grew greatly. At the same time, China was not perceived by other countries to be a threat to the leading great power (the United States) and its world order. As a result, China had a joyous and productive environment in which there was a relatively large increase in freedom, civility, and creativity, and in which people could make their dreams into great realities and most people benefited, though the rich benefited more than the poor. As is typically the case, these policies also produced greater wealth gaps and greater amounts of corruption. That began to end when Xi came to power, not because he came to power but because of where China was in its Big Cycle and how the new leadership approached it.
1978 年邓小平上台后，他减少了一个人的控制和镇压，增加了集体领导，用更多的自由市场和越来越大剂量的资本主义取代了顽固的专制共产主义，并开放中国，让外国人来中国学习和赚钱。这就像在肥沃的土地上洒水，导致百花齐放。从 1978 年到习近平上台，中国经历了一次典型的资本主义复兴，经济、生活水平和债务都大幅增长。与此同时，其他国家并不认为中国对主要大国（美国）及其世界秩序构成威胁。因此，中国拥有一个欢乐而富有成效的环境，自由、文明和创造力都有了较大幅度的提高，人们可以将梦想变为伟大的现实，大多数人都从中受益，尽管富人比穷人受益更多。与通常情况一样，这些政策也造成了更大的贫富差距和更多的腐败。这种情况在习近平上台后开始结束，这并不是因为他上台，而是因为中国正处于大周期中，以及新领导层是如何处理这个问题的。 - When President Xi came to power in 2012, a roughly 11-year transition began that brought China from what it was like in 2012 to what it is like today. I was lucky to see it up close. At the start of his presidency, Xi and the leadership’s main goals were to reform the economy and eliminate corruption. For most of Xi’s first five-year term there was a) still an openness to outside thinking, b) a strong desire to further reform the economy by making it more market-driven and building and reforming the capital markets, and c) strong actions taken to eliminate corruption. The senior leaders chosen were the ones who were inclined to do those things. Of course, how to do these things was debated and some people benefited from the changes while others were hurt by them, so in Xi’s first term there was a movement to consolidate power via a move to “core leadership.” This became most clear in the leadership changes that accompanied the shift from the first to the second five-year term under Xi. In 2015, Xi put out his bold 2025 plan, which was viewed as aspirational by the Chinese and threatening by Americans. China could no longer “hide power.” Americans viewed the Chinese as a threat. By the time Donald Trump came to power in 2017 and Xi began his second term in 2017, the great power conflict had begun. In 2019-20, COVID-19 emerged. At the same time, the debt bubble and the wealth gaps had grown—so the classic convergence of forces led to the formation of the “100-year big storm.” In 2021, about halfway through Xi’s second term, China’s domestic debt bubble burst and the international great power conflict intensified. At the beginning of Xi’s third term in October 2022, China’s leadership changed from reform-minded globalists to loyal communist nationalists, and purges and crackdowns ensued, which brings us up until now. I will soon describe what things now look like, but before I do, I want to drive home the point about how the Big Cycle is playing a big role in driving what has happened.
2012 年习主席上台后，中国开始了长达 11 年的转型，从 2012 年的样子变成了今天的样子。在担任国家主席之初，习近平和领导层的主要目标是改革经济和消除腐败。在习近平第一个五年任期的大部分时间里：a) 对外界思想仍然持开放态度；b) 强烈希望进一步改革经济，使其更加市场化，建设和改革资本市场；c) 采取有力行动消除腐败。被选中的高级领导人都是倾向于做这些事情的人。当然，如何做这些事情还存在争议，一些人从变革中受益，而另一些人则因此受到伤害，因此在习近平的第一个任期内，出现了通过向 "核心领导层 "转变来巩固权力的运动。这一点在伴随着习近平第一个五年任期向第二个五年任期转变的领导层变动中表现得最为明显。2015 年，习近平提出了大胆的 "2025 计划"，中国人将其视为理想，而美国人则将其视为威胁。中国再也不能 "隐藏实力 "了。美国人将中国视为威胁。2017 年唐纳德-特朗普上台，2017 年习近平开始第二任期，大国冲突已经开始。2019-20 年，COVID-19 出现。与此同时，债务泡沫和贫富差距不断扩大--于是，典型的合力导致了 "百年大风暴 "的形成。2021 年，习近平第二个任期过半，中国国内债务泡沫破灭，国际大国矛盾激化。2022 年 10 月，习近平的第三个任期开始，中国的领导层从具有改革意识的全球主义者转变为忠诚的共产主义民族主义者，随之而来的是清洗和镇压，这使我们走到了现在。我很快就会介绍现在的情况，但在此之前，我想强调一点，即大循环是如何在推动所发生的一切方面发挥重要作用的。
The Hand Xi Was Dealt and How He Is Choosing to Play That Hand
习近平的牌和他选择的打牌方式
A Chinese leader, historian, and friend of mine told me several years ago that the conditions of the times create the type of leader that emerges because the evolutionary process pulls out the leader who suits the environment. In other words, how the times are transpiring determines the leader even more than the leader determines how the times are going. He gave me the book The Role of the Individual in History by the Russian political philosopher Georgi Plekhanov, which you might find interesting. When Henry Kissinger was writing his book on leadership and we talked about what makes a great leader, he made the same point—that what made a great leader at the time depended on what was needed at the time. For example, Konrad Adenauer (Germany’s chancellor immediately after World War II) was a great leader for a country that was defeated after a war because he knew how to be both deferential and pushy enough to deal with both 1) the dominant powers that Germany had just came out of a horrendous war with and 2) a domestic population that was defeated and destroyed in most ways. My point is that what is happening now and Xi’s leadership must be looked at within the context of the Big Cycle. In other words, it is important to distinguish between the hand that Xi was dealt and how he has been choosing to play it. It is also important to understand what is happening now and how Xi is playing his hand without judging these things, because judging them can stand in the way of understanding them. My goal is only to understand what’s happening and what’s likely to happen, and I don’t want to let judgments stand in the way of doing that.
几年前，一位中国领导人、历史学家和我的朋友告诉我，时代条件造就了领导者的类型，因为进化过程会产生适合环境的领导者。换句话说，时代如何发展决定了领导者，甚至超过了领导者决定时代如何发展的程度。他给了我一本俄罗斯政治哲学家格奥尔基-普列汉诺夫（Georgi Plekhanov）写的书《个人在历史上的作用》（The Role of the Individual in History），你可能会对这本书感兴趣。亨利-基辛格（Henry Kissinger）在写关于领导力的书时，我们谈到了如何成为伟大领袖的问题，他提出了同样的观点--在当时，如何成为伟大领袖取决于当时的需要。例如，康拉德-阿登纳（二战后德国总理）对于一个战后战败的国家来说是一位伟大的领导人，因为他知道如何既恭顺又强势地处理以下两方面的问题：1）德国刚刚经历了一场可怕战争的强国；2）在大多数方面被打败和摧毁的国内民众。换句话说，重要的是要区分习近平手中的牌和他选择的打牌方式。同样重要的是，要了解现在发生了什么以及习近平是如何出牌的，而不要对这些事情妄加评判，因为评判这些事情会妨碍对它们的理解。我的目标只是了解正在发生的事情和可能发生的事情，我不想让评判妨碍我这样做。
As I see it, the template to keep in mind is that capitalism (with or without “Chinese characteristics”) produces credit that creates spending power, which when used well unleashes creativity and prosperity, which produces the upward wave in the cycle. But it also inevitably creates a lot of debt and wealth gaps, and when the debt becomes too large to pay off and there are big wealth gaps, that causes the cycle to reverse. When there is a lot of debt and big wealth gaps at the same time as there are great domestic and international power conflicts and/or great disruptive changes in nature (like droughts, floods, and pandemics, which China is especially prone to) and great changes in technology, there is an increased likelihood of a “100-year big storm.” That is the current environment in China. Destiny put Xi in the position he is in, and how he plays his hand will reflect where he is coming from, motivating him to do what he does, which will have a big influence on what happens.
在我看来，需要牢记的模板是，资本主义（无论是否具有 "中国特色"）产生的信贷创造了消费能力，如果使用得当，就会释放出创造力和繁荣，从而产生周期中的上升浪潮。但这也不可避免地会产生大量债务和贫富差距，当债务变得无法偿还、贫富差距过大时，就会导致周期逆转。当出现大量债务和巨大贫富差距的同时，又出现巨大的国内和国际权力冲突和/或大自然的巨大破坏性变化（如干旱、洪水和大流行病，中国尤其容易发生）以及技术的巨大变化时，"百年不遇的大风暴 "的可能性就会增加。这就是中国当前的环境。命运将习近平置于其所处的位置，他如何出牌将反映出他的出身，促使他做什么，这将对所发生的事情产生很大影响。
History shows that in all countries through all times during these very difficult 100-year-storm-like periods, leaders go to much more autocratic policies because the alternative becomes great internal conflict and disorder, and typically there are forced changes of leadership that those in power fight against. This is especially true in the Chinese culture. Losing the “mandate of heaven” is something everyone is aware of. A Chinese scholar told me that 38% of China’s emperors died of unnatural causes while in power. There are many dynasties that went through such big storm periods and different philosophies that emperors used to guide them. “Legalism” is the belief that people are motivated by self-interest, especially during difficult times, so they must be required to strictly follow the emperor and his rules, especially big storm periods. The legalist approach with Marxist/Maoist characteristics appears to be the approach Xi has chosen. To be clear, I don’t think that what it is exactly is clear to either non-policy makers or policy makers. They appear to be figuring out the “dialectic.” For example, I know that entrepreneurship and open markets remain much more open than my characterization of a legalist approach with Marxist/Maoist characteristics would seem to imply.
历史表明，在所有国家的所有时期，在这些非常困难的类似百年风暴的时期，领导人都会采取更加专制的政策，因为另一种选择会导致巨大的内部冲突和混乱，通常会出现被迫更换领导层的情况，而掌权者则会与之抗争。这在中国文化中尤为明显。失去 "天命 "是每个人都知道的事情。一位中国学者告诉我，中国有 38% 的皇帝在位时非正常死亡。有很多朝代都经历过这样的大风大浪，皇帝们用来指导他们的哲学思想也各不相同。所谓 "法家"，就是认为人的动机是利己的，尤其是在困难时期，所以必须要求人们严格遵守皇帝和他的规则，尤其是大风大浪时期。说白了，我认为无论是非政策制定者还是政策制定者都不清楚这到底是什么。他们似乎正在摸索 "辩证法"。例如，我知道企业家精神和开放市场仍然比我所描述的具有马克思主义/毛泽东思想特征的法律主义方法似乎暗示的要开放得多。
While people can debate the merits of Xi and the Chinese government creating a fearful and strict-control environment to get people to behave the way the government wants them to behave, just as people can debate the merits of the American government’s more democratic and disorderly approach, it is more important to see what’s happening as objectively as possible than to be quick to pass judgments on it. Here is the current picture of what is happening as I see it.
人们可以争论习近平和中国政府创造一个恐惧和严格控制的环境，让人们按照政府希望的方式行事的好处，就像人们可以争论美国政府更加民主和无序的做法的好处一样，但更重要的是尽可能客观地看待正在发生的事情，而不是急于对其下结论。以下是我所看到的当前情况。
The Current Picture of What Is Happening in China
中国现状
I will describe this in terms of what I see as the five big forces that drive the changing world order and tend to evolve in big cycles. They are: how well the economic system works, how well the internal order works within countries, and how well the world order works between countries, along with acts of nature and technology.
我将从我所认为的五大力量来描述这一点，这五大力量推动着世界秩序的变化，并且往往以大周期的方式发展。它们是：经济体系的运行状况、国家内部秩序的运行状况、国家间世界秩序的运行状况以及自然和技术的作用。
- There are big debt and economic problems that are depressing economic activity, prices, and psychology. Domestically, it is a very difficult time for China financially because many people are suffering the negative wealth effects of falling a) real estate prices, b) equity and other asset prices, c) employment, and d) employee compensation. Also, there are debt and financial problems that exist in many companies and many local governments that are drags, which, if not properly dealt with, will have bad consequences for a long time. These things have contributed to the mood having become more dour.
从国内来看，中国的财政状况非常困难，因为很多人正在遭受以下因素带来的负财富效应：a) 房地产价格下降；b) 股票和其他资产价格下降；c) 就业下降；d) 员工薪酬下降。此外，许多企业和地方政府还存在债务和财政问题，这些问题如果得不到妥善处理，将在很长一段时间内产生不良后果。这些都导致了人们的情绪变得更加低落。
How should these problems be dealt with? To me, as a macroeconomic thinker who approaches such debt and economic problems more like a doctor than an ideologue, the leadership needs to have a debt restructuring, which it should do via engineering a beautiful deleveraging (see my book Principles for Navigating Big Debt Crises, which I’m giving you here for free if you’re interested in delving into what that looks like) or it will have a “lost decade” like Japan’s. While many people think policy makers should ease monetary policy to create more credit, I think they correctly view creating more credit and debt like giving an alcoholic a drink to help ease withdrawal problems. I believe that they should engineer both 1) a deleveraging (which is deflationary, depressing, and will reduce the debt burden) and 2) an easing of monetary policy (which is inflationary, stimulative, and will ease the debt burden) so that the deflationary ways of reducing debt and the inflationary ways of doing it balance. This is what I mean by a “beautiful deleveraging.” In my opinion, this should have been done two years ago and if not done will probably lead to a lost decade. I think some of the economic leaders, especially those who did this under Zhu Rongji, understand how to do this, but it is very difficult and politically dangerous to do because it engineers big changes in wealth, which is politically challenging, especially during a difficult time because people squawk. In my opinion, if the leadership doesn’t execute a beautiful deleveraging, China will have a Japanese-style lost decade with Marxist characteristics.
应该如何处理这些问题？在我看来，作为一名宏观经济思想家，我更像一名医生而不是一名意识形态主义者来处理这些债务和经济问题，领导层需要进行债务重组，而这应该通过漂亮的去杠杆化工程来实现（参见我的著作《驾驭大债务危机的原则》，如果你有兴趣深入了解这本书的内容，我将在这里免费赠送给你），否则就会像日本一样出现 "失去的十年"。虽然很多人认为政策制定者应该放松货币政策以创造更多信贷，但我认为他们正确地看待创造更多信贷和债务，就像给酒鬼一杯酒以缓解戒酒问题一样。我认为，他们应该同时设计：1）去杠杆化（这是通货紧缩、令人沮丧的，并将减轻债务负担）；2）放松货币政策（这是通货膨胀、刺激性的，并将减轻债务负担），从而使减少债务的通货紧缩方式与减少债务的通货膨胀方式达到平衡。这就是我所说的 "美丽的去杠杆化"。在我看来，两年前就应该这样做了，如果不这样做，很可能会导致一个失去的十年。我认为，一些经济领导人，尤其是在朱镕基领导下做过这件事的人，明白如何做这件事，但做起来非常困难，而且在政治上也很危险，因为它意味着财富的巨大变化，这在政治上具有挑战性，尤其是在困难时期，因为人们会抱怨。在我看来，如果领导层不实施漂亮的去杠杆化，中国将出现日本式的具有马克思主义特色的失去的十年。
The aging population issue is a heavy weight for those who are old, for their children, and for the government’s finances and social issues. The average age of retirement is 53 and the average age of death is 84, so people without incomes have to be taken care of for 31 years on average. This is made more difficult because the previous one-child policy means that one person has to take care of two parents. This has been a depressant in the mood and the financial situation. While the retirement age should be raised and a social support system including old-age care should be improved, neither is happening at an adequate pace. That is mostly because people don’t want their retirement ages to rise so doing that is politically untenable and because the government bureaucracy is moving very slowly, especially now that most government officials are reluctant to take bold actions because those can be politically disruptive (as they were in other countries, most notably France) and people squawk, so it takes courage. Also, with the workforce declining and old people getting ill and passing away, this is burdensome and depressing. Once again, this is likely to remain a burden unless the government deals with it in a more forceful way.
人口老龄化问题对老年人、他们的子女以及政府财政和社会问题都是一个沉重的负担。平均退休年龄为 53 岁，平均死亡年龄为 84 岁，因此，没有收入的人平均需要照顾 31 年。由于以前的独生子女政策意味着一个人要照顾两个父母，这就使照顾变得更加困难。这对人们的情绪和经济状况都是一种压抑。虽然退休年龄应该提高，包括养老在内的社会支持系统应该完善，但这两方面都进展缓慢。这主要是因为人们不希望自己的退休年龄提高，所以这样做在政治上是站不住脚的，而且政府官僚机构的行动也非常缓慢，尤其是现在大多数政府官员都不愿意采取大胆的行动，因为这些行动可能会在政治上造成破坏（在其他国家也是如此，最明显的是法国），而且人们会发出抱怨，所以这需要勇气。此外，随着劳动力的减少，老人生病和去世，这也是一种负担，令人沮丧。同样，除非政府以更有力的方式加以解决，否则这很可能仍然是一个负担。
- The internal wealth gap and the resulting conflict over wealth and values are intensifying, which is fear-inducing. The internal wealth gap has led to the government’s push for common prosperity and government-directed, seemingly arbitrary rather than rule-based actions. These moves appear to some people to be anti-capitalist, while to others they are simply the government’s messages to people to stay out of politics and do what the leadership wants them to do to help society. In any case, it’s fear-inducing and oppressive, especially for the capitalist elites. On a recent trip to China, my Chinese friends reminded me that throughout Chinese history, it’s typically been the case that you can’t be rich and be a government official. The merchant-capitalist who sought financial gain was traditionally assumed to be dangerously greedy and easily corruptible, and not allowed to be in government. It wasn’t until 2002 that these merchant-capitalists were allowed to become Communist Party members. That was during the reformist period. Now it is no longer as “glorious to be rich.” As is increasingly the case around the world but more so in China, there is a greater inclination to think that the rich are selfish and corrupt. Purging and rooting out corruption is also going on in most areas, perhaps most notably in the military. In other words, it’s a time of big policing and strict enforcing of what should be done and how people should behave that has become threatening to some.
2.内部贫富差距以及由此引发的财富和价值观冲突加剧，令人恐惧。内部贫富差距导致政府推动共同富裕，政府主导的行动看似武断，而非有章可循。在一些人看来，这些举动是反资本主义的，而在另一些人看来，这些举动不过是政府向人们发出的信息，让他们远离政治，做领导希望他们做的事情，以帮助社会。无论如何，这都是一种恐惧和压迫，尤其是对资本主义精英而言。在最近的一次中国之行中，我的中国朋友提醒我，纵观中国历史，典型的情况是有钱也当不了官。追求经济利益的商人资本家历来被认为是危险的贪婪者和容易腐败的人，不允许他们当官。直到 2002 年，这些商人资本家才被允许成为共产党员。那是在改革开放时期。现在，"致富光荣 "不再是一句空话。全世界的情况都是如此，而中国的情况更是如此，人们更倾向于认为富人是自私和腐败的。大多数领域都在清除和根除腐败，军队可能最为明显。换句话说，这是一个大警察的时代，严格执行应该做什么和人们应该如何做的规定，这对一些人来说已经成为一种威胁。
With the pendulum now swinging in the more legalistic, autocratic, communist direction, naturally people are asking how far it will go, which leads people to probably exaggerate the possibilities. My study of Chinese history (and my studies of similar histories in analogous periods) has put in my mind, which are also in some others’ minds, the memories of anti-rightist-capitalist campaigns that led to the persecutions of such people, the confiscations of wealth, the shutting down of stock markets, the enforcing of strict foreign exchange controls, the restrictions against leaving China, and the questions about whether that is where China is headed. People remember the civil war and the changes after 1949. The elites who are experiencing these pains to a greater degree are more concerned. It appears that the “elites” are most concerned and least supportive of Xi, while many who feel Xi is trying to take care of them from being exploited by the elites are strongly supportive of him. It appears that Xi and the leadership think that most of those people who are discontented are spoiled and unappreciative of how much better off they are than they were not long ago and that they need to toughen up, get disciplined, and get in line with the program to help others. This has contributed to the mood becoming more dour and pessimistic.
钟摆现在正朝着更加法制化、专制化和共产主义的方向摆动，人们自然会问它会走多远，这可能会导致人们夸大可能性。我对中国历史的研究（以及我对类似时期类似历史的研究）让我（也让其他一些人）想起了反右运动，这些运动导致了对这些人的迫害、没收财富、关闭股票市场、实施严格的外汇管制、限制离开中国，以及关于这是否就是中国的走向的问题。人们还记得 1949 年之后的内战和变革。而更多经历过这些阵痛的精英们则更加忧心忡忡。看起来，"精英 "们最关心也最不支持习近平，而许多认为习近平试图照顾他们免受精英剥削的人则强烈支持他。习近平和领导层似乎认为，大多数不满的人都是被宠坏的，不知道自己的生活比不久前好了多少，他们需要坚强起来，遵守纪律，按计划帮助他人。这导致情绪变得更加沉闷和悲观。
No one knows how far the pendulum will swing back toward the more Maoist/Marxist ways of doing things. The absence of clear communication from the leadership about the motivations behind their actions and where they are headed is leading to greater amounts of imaginary speculation than there would be if there were clearer communication. The impediment is that communicating more directly is not the Chinese leadership’s traditional way of doing things, which, as China goes back toward the more traditional ways of doing things, is understandable. China’s new premier Li Qiang’s decision to discontinue press conferences for the first time in 30 years is consistent with the move to lesser clarity rather than greater clarity at this time of greater risk.
没有人知道钟摆会在多大程度上摆回毛泽东/马克思主义的做事方式。由于领导层没有就其行动背后的动机和方向进行明确的沟通，这就导致了更多的臆测，而如果有更明确的沟通，臆测就会更多。阻碍因素在于，更直接的沟通并不是中国领导层的传统行事方式，而随着中国向更传统的行事方式回归，这是可以理解的。中国新任总理李强 30 年来首次决定不再举行记者招待会，这与在当前风险更大的情况下减少而非增加清晰度的做法是一致的。
- The great-power conflict between China and the US is having a big negative effect. It is causing foreign investors and businesses and domestic investors and businesses to want to diversify or leave China and to fear being discriminated against globally for being friendly to China. In trade and capital flows, a cat-and-mouse game has developed that has led companies and people to move to neutral countries and to try to appear to be non-Chinese or not Chinese sympathizers, so much so that the Chinese are having problems getting other countries and companies to accept them being there and/or investing in them. For example, Chinese businesses setting up Mexican companies and exporting to the US to get around tariffs on Chinese goods is leading the US to explore moving to look through the entities to identify the beneficial owners to catch and punish these entities. The TikTok identity pursuit game is the most attention-getting example. Even in the industries and world markets that China has become very competitive in—most obviously electric vehicles, batteries, green energy (solar and wind) products, chips, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space, etc.—there are geopolitical conflicts that blend with economic conflicts, so they are increasingly run by governments. The not-too-long-ago old days of free and open markets and the idea that government interference in them is bad are gone for the foreseeable future. This will affect China because it has excess capacity and will be accused of dumping, leading to big tariff increases as protectionism and nationalism come back into fashion as they did in the 1930s. The Chinese economic model is based on gaining an increasing share of world manufacturing output, which has a good chance of not happening because countries that in the past have imported Chinese goods are more likely to prevent them with rising tariffs.
3.中美之间的大国冲突正在产生巨大的负面影响。它导致外国投资者和企业以及国内投资者和企业希望分散投资或离开中国，并担心因对中国友好而在全球受到歧视。在贸易和资本流动方面，一种 "猫捉老鼠 "的游戏已经形成，它导致公司和人员转移到中立国家，并试图表现得非中国人或不同情中国，以至于中国人难以让其他国家和公司接受他们的存在和/或投资。例如，中国企业在墨西哥设立公司并出口到美国，以规避对中国商品征收的关税，这导致美国开始探索通过实体来识别实际所有人，从而抓住并惩罚这些实体。TikTok身份追逐游戏就是最引人关注的例子。即使是在中国已经变得非常有竞争力的行业和世界市场--最明显的是电动汽车、电池、绿色能源（太阳能和风能）产品、芯片、人工智能、量子计算、太空等--也存在着与经济冲突相融合的地缘政治冲突，因此它们越来越多地由政府管理。在可预见的未来，自由开放的市场和政府干预市场是坏事的观念将一去不复返。这将对中国产生影响，因为中国产能过剩，会被指责倾销，导致关税大幅提高，因为保护主义和民族主义会像 20 世纪 30 年代那样重新流行起来。中国经济模式的基础是在世界制造业产出中获得越来越大的份额，这很有可能不会发生，因为过去进口中国商品的国家更有可能通过提高关税来阻止中国商品的进口。
In addition to economic clashes with the West, there are cultural clashes. They were described to me by a Chinese leader as mutual cultural ignorance with evolutionary change. He explained that 1) the Anglo-European culture extended by Great Britain passing dominance to the US is having problems accepting the rise of China and its Chinese-Asian culture, 2) there are failures of the two sides to understand and accept the different approaches, and 3) Western culture is more zero-sum than win-win and more inclined to slip into lose-lose wars. I agree with his assessment and find it tragic. It is certainly the case that the Chinese fight wars differently. Think about the “art of war”—fighting to win by focusing on the “pressure points” that can weaken or hurt the other side without even being seen. For example, if one were conjecturing how the Chinese might play the existing geopolitical situation if the conflict rises, because the US is overextended in two wars, the Chinese might think about where there could be a third front—like a war in Asia, something like a conflict with the Philippines or North Korea, that would put the two sides in the US election in the awkward position of having to step into a third conflict (which would be unpopular in the US) or not appear strong enough. Almost all leaders on both sides believe that the other side is working to destroy the other and are working to be able to destroy the other. They are in an intensifying prisoner’s dilemma. To be clear, I don’t believe that either side wants to provoke the other side, and I do believe that greater understanding of and respect for the other’s culture are required. But more than that, each should ask the other, “What are your greatest existential fears?” and work with the other side to figure out what can be done to alleviate them. Without that, the odds of some sort of a devastating war within the next 10 years are high and people are positioning themselves with that possibility in mind, which itself is very damaging.
除了与西方的经济冲突，还有文化冲突。一位中国领导人向我描述了这种冲突，称其为文化上的互不了解与进化变化。他解释说：1）由英国主导地位延伸到美国的盎格鲁-欧洲文化在接受中国的崛起及其中国-亚洲文化方面存在问题；2）双方未能理解和接受不同的方法；3）西方文化更倾向于零和而非双赢，更倾向于陷入两败俱伤的战争。我同意他的评价，并认为这是一个悲剧。中国人打仗的方式确实与众不同。试想一下 "战争艺术"--通过专注于 "压力点"，在不经意间削弱或伤害对方，从而赢得战争。举例来说，如果有人猜想，如果冲突升级，中国人可能会如何玩转现有的地缘政治局势，因为美国在两场战争中过度扩张，中国人可能会考虑哪里可能有第三条战线，比如亚洲的战争，类似与菲律宾或朝鲜的冲突，这将使美国大选中的双方陷入不得不介入第三场冲突（这在美国不得人心）或显得不够强大的尴尬境地。几乎所有双方领导人都认为，对方正在努力摧毁对方，并且正在努力能够摧毁对方。他们正处于愈演愈烈的囚徒困境之中。说白了，我并不认为任何一方想要激怒另一方，我也确实认为需要加强对对方文化的理解和尊重。但更重要的是，双方都应该问对方："你最大的生存恐惧是什么？"并与对方合作，找出缓解这些恐惧的办法。如果做不到这一点，未来 10 年内发生某种毁灭性战争的几率就会很高，而人们在进行自我定位时就会考虑到这种可能性，这本身就具有很大的破坏性。
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Climate and climate-related issues are big, threatening, and top-of-mind. They extend from having droughts, floods, and pandemics to not having enough clean water. They will probably cost a lot and hurt a lot.
4.气候和与气候相关的问题是重大的、具有威胁性的，也是人们关注的焦点。这些问题包括干旱、洪水和大流行病，也包括没有足够的清洁水。这些问题可能会造成巨大损失和伤害。 -
While technology development has always been a critical defining force and while it is well known that whoever wins the technology war wins the economic, geopolitical, and military wars, this has never been truer than now, and China and the US are the leaders and big adversaries. Throughout the history of war, the desired path has been to secretively build the technology that is strong enough so that showing it to the opposition will make the opposition become submissive. Watch the movie Oppenheimer for a refresher. That is certainly going on. There are many technologies that both China and the US are putting huge amounts of talent and resources into using their different approaches, one more top-down, government-directed and one more bottom-up, corporate/capitalist—some of which we know about (e.g., chips, AI, quantum computing, outer space, cyber, batteries, clean energy, electric vehicles, robotics, etc.), some of which China is in the lead on, and some of which the US is in the lead on, and none of which we can anticipate exactly how it will transpire in the future. I won’t digress into looking into these because it would take too long, and now is the time to step back up to look at the big picture.
5.虽然技术发展一直是关键的决定性力量，而且众所周知，谁赢得了技术战争，谁就赢得了经济、地缘政治和军事战争，但这一点从未像现在这样真实，而中国和美国是领头羊和大对手。纵观战争史，人们希望走的道路是秘密地建造足够强大的技术，以便向对手展示这些技术，从而使对手屈服。请观看电影《奥本海默》，温故而知新。这种情况确实存在。中美两国都在利用各自不同的方式投入大量的人才和资源，一种是自上而下、政府主导型的，一种是自下而上、企业/资本主义型的--其中有些技术我们已经知道（如芯片、人工智能、量子计算、外太空、网络、电池、清洁能源、电动汽车、机器人等），有些技术中国处于领先地位，有些技术美国处于领先地位，但我们都无法准确预测未来会如何发展。我不打算深入探讨这些问题，因为这需要太长时间，现在是回头看看大局的时候了。
For the previously described reasons it is understandable why President Xi believes that there is a 100-year storm on the horizon. That assessment seems right to me. At the same time, I am not certain of anything other than that I am trying to be as objective and helpful as possible in bringing about understanding. China is an enigma that I am trying to make less enigmatic. I have been very lucky to see up close for nearly 40 years what has happened in China, the United States, and China-US relations, all of which I care about deeply. And I have found it all intensely interesting and important to watch. It seems that we all have been affected by the supposed Chinese curse “May you live in interesting times.”
基于上述原因，可以理解为什么习主席认为百年不遇的风暴即将来临。在我看来，这一判断是正确的。与此同时，我并不确定自己在做什么，只是在尽可能客观地帮助人们理解中国。中国是一个谜，我正试图让它变得不那么谜。近 40 年来，我非常幸运地近距离观察了中国、美国和中美关系所发生的一切，我对所有这些都非常关心。我发现这一切都非常有趣，也非常重要。似乎我们都受到了所谓的中国咒语 "愿你生活在有趣的时代 "的影响。
Since I published this, a number of people have asked what I think about investing in China. I find high quality Chinese assets very attractively priced and I have done very well investing there. I also have great affection and respect for the Chinese people and culture. For these reasons, I remain committed to my meaningful work, meaningful relationships, and investing there--and to trying to improve mutual understanding through my radical truthfulness.
自从我发表这篇文章以来，很多人问我对投资中国有什么看法。我认为中国优质资产的价格非常有吸引力，我在中国的投资业绩非常好。我对中国人民和中国文化也怀有深厚的感情和敬意。出于这些原因，我将继续致力于我有意义的工作、有意义的关系以及在中国的投资--并通过我的激进的真实性努力增进相互理解。
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Bridgewater Daily Observations》由 Bridgewater Associates, LP 编写，是 Bridgewater Associates, LP 的财产，仅用于信息和教育目的。不考虑任何接收者的具体投资需求、目标或容忍度。此外，基于客户投资限制、投资组合再平衡和交易成本等多种因素，桥水公司的实际投资状况可能而且经常会与本文讨论的结论不同。读者在做出任何投资决定之前，应咨询自己的顾问，包括税务顾问。本资料仅供参考和教育之用，并不构成出售或招揽购买所述证券或其他工具的要约。任何此类发售都将根据最终发售备忘录进行。本材料不构成个人建议，也未考虑个人投资者的特定投资目标、财务状况或需求，而这些是做出任何投资决策前的必要考虑因素。投资者应考虑本研究中的任何意见或建议是否适合其特定情况，并酌情寻求专业建议，包括法律、税务、会计、投资或其他建议。
The information provided herein is not intended to provide a sufficient basis on which to make an investment decision and investment decisions should not be based on simulated, hypothetical, or illustrative information that have inherent limitations. Unlike an actual performance record simulated or hypothetical results do not represent actual trading or the actual costs of management and may have under or overcompensated for the impact of certain market risk factors. Bridgewater makes no representation that any account will or is likely to achieve returns similar to those shown. The price and value of the investments referred to in this research and the income therefrom may fluctuate. Every investment involves risk and in volatile or uncertain market conditions, significant variations in the value or return on that investment may occur. Investments in hedge funds are complex, speculative and carry a high degree of risk, including the risk of a complete loss of an investor’s entire investment. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, future returns are not guaranteed, and a complete loss of original capital may occur. Certain transactions, including those involving leverage, futures, options, and other derivatives, give rise to substantial risk and are not suitable for all investors. Fluctuations in exchange rates could have material adverse effects on the value or price of, or income derived from, certain investments.
此处提供的信息无意为投资决策提供充分依据，投资决策不应基于具有内在局限性的模拟、假设或说明性信息。与实际业绩记录不同，模拟或假设的结果并不代表实际交易或实际管理成本，而且可能对某些市场风险因素的影响补偿不足或补偿过度。桥水不保证任何账户将会或有可能获得与所示结果类似的回报。本研究中提及的投资的价格和价值及其收益可能会波动。每项投资都涉及风险，在波动或不确定的市场条件下，该投资的价值或回报可能会发生重大变化。对冲基金的投资是复杂的投机性投资，具有很高的风险，包括投资者完全丧失全部投资的风险。过去的业绩不能作为未来业绩的指导，未来的回报也不能保证，原始资本可能会完全损失。某些交易，包括涉及杠杆、期货、期权和其他衍生工具的交易，会产生巨大风险，并不适合所有投资者。汇率波动可能对某些投资的价值、价格或收益产生重大不利影响。
Bridgewater research utilizes data and information from public, private, and internal sources, including data from actual Bridgewater trades. Sources include BCA, Bloomberg Finance L.P., Bond Radar, Candeal, CBRE, Inc., CEIC Data Company Ltd., China Bull Research, Clarus Financial Technology, CLS Processing Solutions, Conference Board of Canada, Consensus Economics Inc., DataYes Inc, Dealogic, DTCC Data Repository, Ecoanalitica, Empirical Research Partners, Entis (Axioma Qontigo Simcorp), EPFR Global, Eurasia Group, Evercore ISI, FactSet Research Systems, Fastmarkets Global Limited, the Financial Times Limited, FINRA, GaveKal Research Ltd., Global Financial Data, GlobalSource Partners, Harvard Business Review, Haver Analytics, Inc., Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the Investment Funds Institute of Canada, ICE Derived Data (UK), Investment Company Institute, International Institute of Finance, JP Morgan, JSTA Advisors, M Science LLC, MarketAxess, Medley Global Advisors (Energy Aspects Corp), Metals Focus Ltd, Moody’s ESG Solutions, MSCI, Inc., National Bureau of Economic Research, Neudata, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Pensions & Investments Research Center, Refinitiv, Rhodium Group, RP Data, Rubinson Research, Rystad Energy, S&P Global Market Intelligence, Scientific Infra/EDHEC, Sentix GmbH, Shanghai Metals Market, Shanghai Wind Information, Smart Insider Ltd., Sustainalytics, Swaps Monitor, Tradeweb, United Nations, US Department of Commerce, Verisk Maplecroft, Visible Alpha, Wells Bay, Wind Financial Information LLC, Wood Mackenzie Limited, World Bureau of Metal Statistics, World Economic Forum, and YieldBook. While we consider information from external sources to be reliable, we do not assume responsibility for its accuracy.
桥水研究利用来自公共、私人和内部来源的数据和信息，包括桥水实际交易的数据。数据来源包括 BCA、Bloomberg Finance L.P.、Bond Radar、Candeal、CBRE、CEIC Data Company Ltd.、China Bull Research、Clarus Financial Technology、CLS Processing Solutions、Conference Board of Canada、Consensus Economics Inc、DataYes Inc、Dealogic、DTCC Data Repository、Ecoanalitica、Empirical Research Partners、Entis (Axioma Qontigo Simcorp)、EPFR Global、Eurasia Group、Evercore ISI、FactSet Research Systems、Fastmarkets Global Limited、金融时报有限公司、美国金融业监管局、GaveKal Research Ltd.、Global Financial Data、GlobalSource Partners、Harvard Business Review、Haver Analytics、Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)、加拿大投资基金协会、ICE Derived Data (UK)、Investment Company Institute、International Institute of Finance、JP Morgan、JSTA Advisors、M Science LLC、MarketAxess、Medley Global Advisors (Energy Aspects Corp)、Metals Focus Ltd、Moody's ESG Solutions、MSCI, Inc、国家经济研究局、Neudata、经济合作与发展组织、养老金与投资研究中心、Refinitiv、Rhodium Group、RP Data、Rubinson Research、Rystad Energy、S&P Global Market Intelligence、Scientific Infra/EDHEC、Sentix GmbH、上海金属市场、上海风能信息、Smart Insider Ltd.、Sustainalytics、Swaps Monitor、Tradeweb、联合国、美国商务部、Verisk Maplecroft、Visible Alpha、Wells Bay、Wind Financial Information LLC、Wood Mackenzie Limited、世界金属统计局、世界经济论坛和 YieldBook。尽管我们认为外部来源的信息是可靠的，但我们不对其准确性承担责任。
This information is not directed at or intended for distribution to or use by any person or entity located in any jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability, or use would be contrary to applicable law or regulation, or which would subject Bridgewater to any registration or licensing requirements within such jurisdiction. No part of this material may be (i) copied, photocopied, or duplicated in any form by any means or (ii) redistributed without the prior written consent of Bridgewater® Associates, LP.
本信息不针对或旨在向位于任何司法管辖区的任何个人或实体分发或供其使用，如果在该司法管辖区分发、出版、提供或使用本信息将违反适用法律或法规，或会使 Bridgewater 在该司法管辖区受到任何注册或许可要求的约束。未经 Bridgewater® Associates, LP 事先书面同意，不得（i）以任何方式拷贝、复印或复制本材料的任何部分，或（ii）重新分发本材料的任何部分。
The views expressed herein are solely those of Bridgewater as of the date of this report and are subject to change without notice. Bridgewater may have a significant financial interest in one or more of the positions and/or securities or derivatives discussed. Those responsible for preparing this report receive compensation based upon various factors, including, among other things, the quality of their work and firm revenues.
本文所表达的观点仅代表桥水公司截至本报告发布之日的观点，如有变更，恕不另行通知。桥水公司可能在所讨论的一个或多个头寸和/或证券或衍生品中拥有重大财务利益。负责编写本报告的人员根据各种因素获得报酬，其中包括他们的工作质量和公司收入。
