Chinese leader’s consolidation of power makes him bigger target as economic slowdown that’s hit household wealth sees protests rise
中国领导人的权力集中使他成为更大的目标，因为经济放缓打击了家庭财富，抗议活动增加
By Rebecca Choong Wilkins and Josh Xiao
作者：Rebecca Choong Wilkins 和 Josh Xiao2024年3月1日 at GMT+8 06:00
Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power has cleared the path for him to break China’s cycle of debt-driven growth and put the economy on a more sustainable footing. But there’s a big problem: He’s failing to convince the nation that’s a good idea.
习近平的权力集中为他打破中国债务驱动的增长周期，使经济走上更可持续的道路铺平了道路。但有一个大问题：他未能说服国民这是个好主意。
As the world’s second-biggest economy undergoes a prolonged slowdown, Xi’s move to shun the old playbook of unleashing broad stimulus is spurring discontent. The China Dissent Monitor, a project of US-based Freedom House that collects information on protests, says economic demonstrations have remained elevated since August, with many focused on labor disputes and a real estate crisis that’s cutting into household wealth.
随着世界第二大经济体经历长期放缓，习近平放弃了释放大规模刺激的旧战术，引发了不满。总部位于美国的自由之家的中国异议监控项目收集的抗议信息显示，自8月以来，经济示威活动一直处于高位，许多集中在劳动争议和削减家庭财富的房地产危机上。
Thousands of angry retail investors last month flooded the US Embassy’s Weibo page with criticism of the government’s handling of the economy in the midst of a $7 trillion stock rout. Elsewhere on the platform some even insinuated that only a change in the top leadership would spur markets — comments that managed to skirt censors before they were eventually taken down.
上个月，数千名愤怒的零售投资者在美国大使馆的微博页面上对政府在7万亿美元股市暴跌中对经济的处理表示批评。在该平台的其他地方，甚至有人暗示只有更换顶级领导层才能刺激市场——这些评论在被最终删除之前设法避开了审查。
Economic Protests Have Been Higher Since August
自八月以来，经济抗议活动增多
Demonstrations focused on labor and real estate issues
抗议活动主要集中在劳动和房地产问题上
Source: China Dissent Monitor, Bloomberg
来源：中国异议监控，彭博社
Compounding the problems is a broad drop in wages among civil servants who have seen bonuses slashed in recent years as indebted local governments struggle to earn enough revenue. That risks disenfranchising the vast bureaucracy charged with implementing Xi’s vision on the ground.
问题的复合是广泛的公务员工资下降，他们在近年来看到奖金被削减，因为负债累累的地方政府努力赚取足够的收入。这可能会剥夺负责在地面上实施习的愿景的庞大官僚机构的权利。
“As long as my income was decent, I didn’t complain,” said Zhou, a mid-level policeman in a southwestern city who asked to be identified by only his surname, adding that cuts have reduced his bonus by 30% from before the pandemic. “But now the economy is in bad shape, the leadership needs to show us some hope.”
“只要我的收入还不错，我就不会抱怨，”一个只愿意用他的姓氏被识别的西南城市的中级警察周说，他补充说，削减已经将他的奖金从大流行病之前减少了30%。“但是现在经济状况不好，领导层需要给我们展示一些希望。”
While the growing angst doesn’t pose an immediate threat to Xi, who has amassed more power than any Chinese leader since Mao Zedong, broader discontent threatens to exacerbate weakened confidence as consumer prices drop at the fastest pace since the global financial crisis. The domestic strife comes as foreign investors turn away from China, with direct overseas investment in 2023 slumping to a 30-year low.
虽然日益增长的焦虑并不立即威胁到习，他已经积累了比任何一个中国领导人都多的权力，自从毛泽东以来，更广泛的不满情绪威胁着加剧消费者价格以全球金融危机以来最快的速度下降的信心。国内的冲突发生在外国投资者转向中国，2023年的直接海外投资跌至30年低点。
At the same time, there are fewer checks on Xi’s policymaking. The Chinese leader has upended Communist Party norms since consolidating power and installing a coterie of loyalists in 2022, marking a shift from the more collective decision-making that helped propel China’s economic rise. That is also making Xi more of a target as his push to deleverage the property sector leads to a slowdown that’s starting to impact the wider population.
与此同时，对习的政策制定的检查越来越少。自从2022年巩固权力并安装一群忠诚的追随者以来，中国领导人已经颠覆了共产党的规范，这标志着从更集体的决策制定转变，这帮助推动了中国的经济崛起。这也使习成为更多的目标，因为他推动去杠杆化房地产部门导致的放缓开始影响更广泛的人口。
Despite the challenges, the leadership in Beijing appears broadly confident in its plan to reorient the economy, said Yuen Yuen Ang, a professor of China’s political economy at Johns Hopkins University. The danger for Xi is that the “fallout of the decline of the old growth model might be so great it prevents him from moving into the new growth model,” she added. “The big question is, can you make that change fast enough?”
尽管面临挑战，约翰霍普金斯大学中国政治经济学教授洪源源表示，北京的领导层对其重新定向经济的计划大体上仍然充满信心。她补充说，习近平面临的危险是，“旧增长模式的衰退影响可能如此之大，以至于阻止他转向新的增长模式。”“大问题是，你能否足够快地做出这种改变？”
Part of the discontent stems from Xi’s failure to communicate a clear roadmap for reaching his goals. While the Chinese leader has ramped up mentions of “high-quality development” that fuzzy slogan is short on specifics. Economists have taken the phrase to mean putting sustainable growth over chasing the pace of expansion, with an emphasis on boosting innovative technologies.
部分不满源于习近平未能清晰地传达实现他的目标的路线图。虽然这位中国领导人已经加大了提及“高质量发展”的力度，但这个模糊的口号在具体内容上并不明确。经济学家们将这个短语理解为优先考虑可持续增长，而不是追求扩张的速度，强调提升创新技术。
Xi Is Mentioning 'High-Quality Development' More Often
习近平更频繁地提及'高质量发展'
The Chinese leader's use of the slogan surged in 2023 from past years
2023年，中国领导人使用这个口号的频率比过去几年大幅增加
Source: Bloomberg analysis of Xi Jinping's speeches, written articles, and meeting readouts
来源：彭博社对习近平的演讲、文章和会议记录的分析
Note: Each readout is counted as a single event, though Xi sometimes uses the phrase more than once during each occasion.
注意：每次读数都被计为一次事件，尽管习有时在每次场合中会多次使用这个短语。
New growth drivers such as electric vehicles, batteries and renewable energy alone, however, are unlikely to fill the void left by property, which at its peak drove about a quarter of China’s GDP. While bolstering strategic sectors can help shield China from the fallout of its rivalry with the US, overcapacity in these areas also threatens to inflame already tense geopolitical relations.
然而，新的增长驱动力如电动汽车、电池和可再生能源等，不太可能填补房地产留下的空白，房地产在其顶峰时期推动了中国GDP的四分之一左右。虽然加强战略性行业可以帮助中国抵御与美国竞争的冲击，但这些领域的过剩产能也威胁着已经紧张的地缘政治关系。
Xi’s unexplained decision to delay the third plenum, where top officials meet every five years to map out the country’s long-term policy direction, has added to the opacity. That confab of the party’s Central Committee is now delayed by the most in over three decades, as the Chinese leader continues to disrupt norms.
习的决定推迟第三次全体会议的原因未说明，这使得情况更加不透明。全体会议是高级官员每五年一次的会议，用于规划国家的长期政策方向。现在，这个党的中央委员会的会议已经被推迟了最多的三十多年，因为中国的领导人继续打破常规。
Official rhetoric putting a positive spin on things hasn’t helped. An article in the Communist Party’s mouthpiece headlined “There is an atmosphere of optimism throughout the country” was ridiculed by Chinese social media users last month, as they sarcastically contrasted the People’s Daily piece with their own finances.
官方的乐观言论并没有起到任何帮助。上个月，共产党的喉舌发表了一篇标题为“全国充满乐观气氛”的文章，结果被中国的社交媒体用户嘲笑，他们讽刺地将《人民日报》的文章与自己的财务状况进行了对比。
“Everyone in society, and in government, seems to know there’s a problem,” said Neil Thomas, a fellow on Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis. “But there’s not been any decisions made about new approaches to solving those problems.”
“社会中的每个人，包括政府，似乎都知道存在问题，”亚洲社会政策研究所中国分析中心的中国政治研究员尼尔·托马斯说。“但是，尚未做出任何关于解决这些问题的新方法的决定。”
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The economic dissatisfaction comes after Xi’s strict Covid Zero policy undermined investor confidence in China, and sparked an exodus of foreigners and citizens. That misstep was emblematic of the “information cocoon” the president is operating in, said Yun Sun, director of the China program at Washington-based think tank Stimson Center.
经济不满情绪的产生是在习近平严格的零疫情政策破坏了投资者对中国的信心，并引发了外国人和公民的大量流出之后。华盛顿智库斯廷森中心的中国项目主任孙云表示，这个失误象征着总统正在运作的“信息茧”。
“People cater to Xi’s preference for information and policies, which make objective assessment really difficult,” she said. While his abrupt decision to reverse course after rare nationwide protests against Covid lockdowns showed China’s top leader can pivot, “sudden policy turns usually carry a significant cost,” Sun added.
“人们迎合习的信息和政策偏好，这使得客观评估变得非常困难，”她说。尽管他在全国范围内罕见的反对新冠病毒封锁的抗议后突然决定改变方向，显示出中国的最高领导人可以灵活应变，“但突然的政策转变通常会带来重大的成本，”孙补充说。
Chinese citizens have since become more active in protesting economic policies, although directly criticizing Xi remains rare. Nearly a quarter of demonstrations last year took aim at regional leaders in some 1,450 cases where a target was identified by China Dissent Monitor. A group of US-based researchers wrote in a recent report that fear of government repression discourages some 40% of Chinese citizens from participating in anti-regime protests.
自那时以来，中国公民在抗议经济政策方面变得更加积极，尽管直接批评习仍然很少见。去年近四分之一的示威活动针对的是在大约1450个由中国异议监察机构确定的目标中的地方领导人。一群美国的研究人员在最近的一份报告中写道，对政府镇压的恐惧使得大约40%的中国公民不敢参与反政权的抗议。
Xi Jinping, center, at a Spring Festival reception at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Feb. 8.Photographer: Shen Hong/Xinhua/Getty Images
习近平，位于中央，在北京人民大会堂的春节招待会上，日期为2月8日。摄影师：沈宏/新华社/盖蒂图片社
“Citizens also understand the party controls government at all levels, so failure to solve localized problems can reflect on the larger system,” said Kevin Slaten, who leads the China Dissent Monitor project. “Local grievances can certainly morph into larger movements that take on new meaning.”
“公民们也明白，党在各级政府中都有控制权，所以未能解决地方问题可能会反映出整个系统的问题，”负责中国异议监控项目的凯文·斯莱顿说。“地方的不满肯定有可能演变成更大的运动，赋予新的意义。”
Grassroots officials have been left trying to contain the discontent. The principal of a school in southern China warned staff against criticizing Xi or the party before a month-long national break began in January, according to an employee, who asked not to be identified discussing sensitive topics. Even during the pandemic no such message had been handed down, the person added.
基层官员一直在试图平息不满情绪。据一名不愿透露身份的员工称，一所位于中国南部的学校的校长在一月份的一个月长的全国假期开始前，警告员工不要批评习近平或者党。该员工补充说，即使在疫情期间，也没有传达过这样的信息。
In a lengthy essay published in December, China’s security czar Chen Wenqing detailed the benefits of reviving a Mao-era style of grassroots governance to contain local unrest. As China witnesses a “large amount of social conflict and disputes that are difficult to discover, prevent and handle” it’s important to mobilize ordinary people to stabilize society, wrote the former spy chief.
在去年12月发表的一篇长篇文章中，中国的安全主管陈文清详细阐述了复兴毛泽东时代的基层治理风格以遏制地方动荡的好处。陈文清，这位前间谍首脑写道，随着中国见证了“大量难以发现、预防和处理的社会冲突和纠纷”，动员普通人稳定社会变得非常重要。
In eastern Anhui province, that system — known as the “Fengqiao experience” — has seen one party chief instruct unhappy villagers to talk directly to him as unemployment grips the local population. After layoffs at a state-owned enterprise in China’s northeast Liaoning province, a committee was tasked with visiting affected families, ensuring handouts were made on time to minimize unrest.
在安徽省东部，这个被称为“枫桥经验”的系统，使一位党委书记指示不满的村民直接与他交谈，因为失业问题困扰着当地的人口。在中国东北辽宁省的一家国有企业裁员后，一个委员会被指派去访问受影响的家庭，确保及时发放救济金以最大程度地减少不安。
Xi Probed Record Number of Top Officials for Graft in 2023
2023年，习近平调查了创纪录数量的涉嫌贪污的高级官员
Campaign targeted more retired senior cadres than ever
此次活动针对的退休高级干部比以往任何时候都要多
Source: Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
来源：中央纪律检查委员会
As Xi’s corruption campaign rolls on after more than a decade of purges there’s a growing reticence to take chances among officials increasingly focused on security and studying Xi Jinping Thought. Bureaucrats “lying flat” is a problem even recognized by the top leader. At a key economic meeting in December, Xi criticized local officials for procrastinating or misinterpreting the party’s orders.
随着习的反腐运动在经过十多年的清洗后仍在进行，官员们越来越专注于安全和研究习近平思想，对于冒险的态度也越来越谨慎。官员“躺平”甚至被最高领导人所认知为问题。在去年12月的一次重要经济会议上，习批评地方官员拖延或误解党的命令。
“Sometimes you have to give people the room to make mistakes. But right now that’s not there,” said Liqian Ren, director of Modern Alpha at WisdomTree Inc., a New York-based asset management firm. “That’s a problem for China. You need the local officials to be willing to try things.”
“有时候你必须给人们留出犯错误的空间。但现在这个空间并不存在，” WisdomTree Inc.的现代阿尔法主管任礼谦说，这是一家位于纽约的资产管理公司。“这对中国来说是个问题。你需要地方官员愿意尝试新事物。”
Xi’s overarching mission is to meld enhanced Communist Party control with an economic model that minimizes dangerous forces unleashed during the reform era, according to Joseph Torigian, a research fellow at the Hoover History Lab in Stanford University.
习的总体使命是将加强的共产党控制与一个能够最小化改革时代释放的危险力量的经济模式相结合，这是斯坦福大学胡佛历史实验室的研究员约瑟夫·托里吉安的观点。
“Xi isn’t giving up on the economy,” he said, but the Chinese leader wants people to accept that some suffering is needed as he pursues the nation’s bigger goals. “Whether the Chinese people are ready to go on that merry-go-round or not, I guess we’ll see.”
“习并没有放弃经济，”他说，但是中国的领导人希望人们接受为了追求国家的更大目标所需要的一些牺牲。“中国人民是否准备好上这个旋转木马，我想我们将会看到。”
