The country’s historic ascent is levelling off. That need not make it more dangerous.
该国历史性的上升势头正在趋于平稳。这并不会让事情变得更加危险。

May 11th 20232023 年 5 月 11 日

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The rise of China has been a defining feature of the world for the past four decades. Since the country began to open up and reform its economy in 1978, its gdp has grown by a dizzying 9% a year, on average. That has allowed a staggering 800m Chinese citizens to escape from poverty. Today China accounts for almost a fifth of global output. The sheer size of its market and manufacturing base has reshaped the global economy. Xi Jinping, who has ruled China for the past decade, hopes to use his country’s increasing heft to reshape the geopolitical order, too.

过去四十年来，中国的崛起一直是世界的一个决定性特征。自1978年开始改革开放以来，中国国内生产总值平均每年增长9%，令人惊叹。这使得惊人的8亿中国公民摆脱了贫困。如今，中国的产出几乎占全球的五分之一。其庞大的市场和制造基地重塑了全球经济。过去十年统治中国的习近平也希望利用中国日益增强的影响力来重塑地缘政治秩序。

There is just one catch: China’s rapid rise is slowing down. Mr Xi promises a “great rejuvenation” of his country in the coming decades, but the economy is now undergoing something more prosaic: a great maturation. Whereas a decade ago forecasters predicted that China’s gdp would zoom past America’s during the mid-21st century (at market exchange rates) and retain a commanding lead, now a much less dramatic shift is in the offing, resulting in something closer to economic parity.

只有一个问题：中国的快速崛起正在放缓。习近平承诺在未来几十年实现国家的“伟大复兴”，但经济现在正在经历更为平淡的过程：巨大的成熟。十年前，预测者预测中国的 GDP 将在 21 世纪中叶超越美国（按市场汇率计算）并保持领先地位，而现在，一个不那么剧烈的转变即将到来，从而更接近经济平价。

This change in economic trajectory is the subject of fierce debate among China-watchers (see our special Briefing). They are thinking again about China’s clout and its rivalry with America. One view is that Chinese power will fall relative to that of its rivals, which could paradoxically make it more dangerous. In a book last year, Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, two scholars, popularised a theory they called “Peak China”. The country faces decay, they argue, and has reached “the point where it is strong enough to aggressively disrupt the existing order but is losing confidence that time is on its side”. Their study opens with an imagined war over Taiwan.

经济轨迹的这种变化是中国观察人士激烈争论的主题（请参阅我们的特别简报）。他们正在重新思考中国的影响力及其与美国的竞争。一种观点认为，相对于其竞争对手，中国的实力将会下降，这可能会使其变得更加危险。在去年的一本书中，哈尔·布兰兹和迈克尔·贝克利两位学者普及了一种他们称之为“巅峰中国”的理论。他们认为，这个国家面临着衰落，并且已经达到了“强大到足以积极破坏现有秩序，但却失去了时间站在一边的信心”的地步。他们的研究以一场想象中的台湾战争开始。

阅读更多：

• At what height will China’s economy peak?中国经济将在什么高度见顶？
• How Xi Jinping plans to narrow the military gap习近平计划如何缩小军事差距
• How China measures national power中国如何衡量国家实力
• The fall of empires preys on Xi Jinping’s mind帝国的没落困扰着习近平的心
• China learns to manage decline中国学会应对衰退

The Peak China thesis rests on the accurate observation that certain tailwinds are turning to headwinds, hindering Chinese progress. The first big gust comes from demography. China’s working-age population has been declining for about a decade. Last year its population as a whole peaked, and India has now overtaken it. The Communist Party’s attempts to convince Chinese couples to have more children are not working. As a result, the un thinks that by mid-century China’s working-age population could decline by over a quarter. Wave goodbye to the masses of young workers who once filled “the world’s factory”.

“中国巅峰”论点建立在对某些顺风转为逆风、阻碍中国进步的准确观察之上。第一阵风来自人口统计。近十年来，中国的劳动年龄人口一直在下降。去年，其总人口达到顶峰，印度现已超越。共产党试图说服中国夫妇生育更多孩子的努力并未奏效。因此，联合国认为，到本世纪中叶，中国的劳动年龄人口可能会减少四分之一以上。告别了曾经挤满“世界工厂”的大批年轻工人。

Adding workers is one way for an economy to grow. Another is to make better use of the existing population. But China’s second problem is that output per worker is unlikely to rise as fast as forecasters once hoped. More of its resources will go to caring for the elderly. After decades of building houses, roads and railways, spending on infrastructure faces diminishing returns. Mr Xi’s autocratic tendencies have made local entrepreneurs more nervous, which may reduce China’s capacity to innovate in the long run. Geopolitical tensions have made foreign firms eager to diversify supply chains away from China. America wants to hobble China’s capabilities in some “foundational” technologies. Its ban on exporting certain semiconductors and machines to Chinese firms is expected to cut into China’s gdp.

增加工人是经济增长的一种方式。另一个是更好地利用现有人口。但中国的第二个问题是，工人人均产出不可能像预测者曾经希望的那样快速增长。更多的资源将用于照顾老年人。经过几十年的房屋、公路和铁路建设，基础设施支出面临着回报递减的局面。习近平的独裁倾向让当地企业家更加紧张，从长远来看，这可能会降低中国的创新能力。地缘政治紧张局势使得外国公司渴望将供应链多元化，远离中国。美国希望限制中国在一些“基础”技术方面的能力。中国禁止向中国企业出口某些半导体和机器，预计将削减中国的国内生产总值。

All of this is dampening long-run forecasts of China’s economic potential. Twelve years ago Goldman Sachs thought China’s gdp would overtake America’s in 2026 and become over 50% larger by mid-century. Last year it revised that prediction, saying China would surpass America only in 2035 and peak at less than 15% bigger. Others are more gloomy. Capital Economics, a research firm, argues that the country’s economy will never become top dog, instead peaking at 90% of America’s size in 2035. These forecasts are, of course, uncertain. But the most plausible ones seem to agree that China and America will approach economic parity in the next decade or so—and remain locked in this position for decades to come.

所有这些都削弱了对中国经济潜力的长期预测。 12 年前，高盛 (Goldman Sachs) 预计中国的 GDP 将在 2026 年超过美国，并在本世纪中叶增长 50% 以上。去年，它修改了这一预测，称中国要到 2035 年才会超过美国，并达到峰值，增幅不到 15%。其他人则更加悲观。研究公司凯投宏观认为，美国经济永远不会成为领头羊，而是会在 2035 年达到美国经济规模 90% 的峰值。当然，这些预测是不确定的。但最有可能的人似乎都认为，中国和美国将在未来十年左右实现经济平等，并在未来几十年内保持这一地位。

How might China handle this flatter trajectory? In the most optimistic scenario, Mr Xi would make changes to boost productivity growth. With income per person less than half of America’s, China’s population will be keen to improve their living standards. He could try to unleash growth by giving the animal spirits of China’s economy freer rein and his people more freedom of movement. The Chinese government could stop relying on wasteful state-owned banks and enterprises to allocate capital. And it could adopt a less prickly posture abroad, easing geopolitical tensions and reassuring firms that it is safe to do business in China. Such reforms might ultimately make China more powerful—but also, one would hope, less aggressive. The trouble is that Mr Xi, who is 69 and now probably China’s ruler for life, shows no sign of embracing economic or political liberalisation.

中国将如何应对这一平坦的轨迹？在最乐观的情况下，习近平将做出改变以促进生产率增长。由于人均收入不到美国人的一半，中国民众将渴望提高生活水平。他可以尝试通过给予中国经济的动物精神和人民更多的行动自由来释放增长动力。中国政府可以停止依赖浪费的国有银行和企业来配置资本。它还可以在海外采取不那么棘手的姿态，缓解地缘政治紧张局势，并向企业保证在中国做生意是安全的。此类改革最终可能会让中国变得更加强大，但人们希望，中国也不会那么咄咄逼人。问题在于，69 岁的习近平现在可能是中国的终身统治者，但他没有表现出拥抱经济或政治自由化的迹象。

Pessimists fear that China will become more combative as its economic trajectory falters. There are plenty of reasons to think this plausible. Mr Xi stokes a dangerous nationalism, to persuade ordinary Chinese that critics of his rule are slighting China itself. China’s military budget is forecast to rise by over 7% this year, in line with nominal gdp. Its military spending is lower than America’s, but still catching up. Its navy could be 50% bigger than America’s by 2030, and its nuclear arsenal will almost quadruple by 2035. “Beijing’s economic power may be peaking, but no other country is so capable of challenging America globally,” write Messrs Brands and Beckley.

悲观主义者担心，随着经济轨迹的动摇，中国将变得更加好斗。有很多理由认为这是合理的。习近平煽动危险的民族主义，让普通中国人相信，批评他统治的人是在轻视中国本身。预计今年中国的军事预算将增长 7% 以上，与名义 GDP 持平。它的军费开支低于美国，但仍在追赶。到2030年，其海军规模可能比美国大50%，到2035年，其核武库将几乎翻两番。布兰兹和贝克利写道：“北京的经济实力可能已达到顶峰，但没有其他国家有能力在全球范围内挑战美国。”

Peer review 同行评审

Yet the most likely scenario is in the middle ground. The speed of China’s rise in the past two decades has been destabilising, forcing adjustments in the global economic and geopolitical order. That phase of intense economic disruption may now be over. And for all its troubles China’s economy is unlikely to shrink, triggering the kind of nihilistic and destructive thinking that Messrs Brands and Beckley fear. Mr Xi is unpredictable but his country’s long-run economic prospect is neither triumph nor disaster. Faced with decades of being a near-peer of America, China has good reason to eschew hubris and resist invading Taiwan. A crucial question is whether the superpowers can avoid misreading each other’s intentions, and thus stumbling into a conflict. Next week we will examine America’s global leadership—and how it should respond to China in the coming age of superpower parity. ■

然而最有可能的情况是中间立场。过去二十年中国崛起的速度令人不安，迫使全球经济和地缘政治秩序进行调整。经济严重混乱的阶段现在可能已经结束。尽管存在种种问题，中国经济不太可能萎缩，从而引发布兰兹和贝克利担心的那种虚无主义和破坏性思维。习近平难以预测，但中国的长期经济前景既不是胜利，也不是灾难。面对几十年来与美国近乎平起平坐的局面，中国有充分的理由避免傲慢并抵制入侵台湾。一个关键的问题是，超级大国能否避免误读彼此的意图，从而陷入冲突。下周我们将探讨美国的全球领导力，以及在即将到来的超级大国平等时代美国应如何应对中国。 ■