The countries’ economic ties are more profound than they appear
两国的经济联系比表面上看起来更加深厚

Aug 8th 2023 | SINGAPORE 经济学人

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When it comes to tracing the geography of global supply chains, few companies provide a better map than Foxconn, the world’s largest contract manufacturer. This year the Taiwanese giant has built or expanded factories in India, Mexico, Thailand and Vietnam. The Chinese production sites once loved by Western companies are firmly out of fashion. Souring relations between the governments in Washington and Beijing have made businesses increasingly fretful about geopolitical risks. As a consequence, in the first half of the year, America traded more with Mexico and Canada than it did with China for the first time in almost two decades. The map of global trade is being redrawn.

在追踪全球供应链的地理位置方面，很少有公司能比全球最大的代工制造商富士康提供更好的地图。今年，这家台湾巨头在印度、墨西哥、泰国和越南建造或扩建了工厂。曾经受到西方公司喜爱的中国生产基地已经彻底过时了。华盛顿和北京政府之间的关系恶化让企业对地缘政治风险越来越担忧。结果，今年上半年，美国与墨西哥和加拿大的贸易额近二十年来首次超过了与中国的贸易额。全球贸易版图正在重新绘制。

At first glance, this is almost exactly as desired by America’s policymakers. Under first Donald Trump and then Joe Biden, officials have put in place an array of tariffs, rules and subsidies. The latest arrived on August 9th: an executive order introducing screening for outbound investment, and banning some investment into Chinese quantum computing, artificial-intelligence projects and advanced chips. America wants to weaken China’s grip on sensitive industries and, in a motivation that mostly goes unspoken, prepare for a possible invasion of Taiwan by its adversary. This attempt to “de-risk” trade with China is the cornerstone of the White House’s foreign policy. Yet despite extensive efforts, and the reshaping of trade seemingly evident in headline statistics, much of the apparent de-risking is not what it appears.

乍一看，这几乎完全符合美国政策制定者的愿望。先是唐纳德·特朗普，然后是乔·拜登，官员们制定了一系列关税、规则和补贴。最新的消息是在 8 月 9 日发布的：一项行政命令，对境外投资进行筛选，并禁止对中国量子计算、人工智能项目和先进芯片进行部分投资。美国希望削弱中国对敏感行业的控制，并出于一种大多不言而喻的动机，为对手可能入侵台湾做好准备。这种对华贸易“去风险”的尝试是白宫外交政策的基石。然而，尽管付出了巨大的努力，而且贸易重塑在整体统计数据中似乎很明显，但许多明显的去风险措施并不像表面上看起来的那样。

Instead of being slashed, trade links between America and China are enduring—just in more tangled forms. The American government’s preferred trading partners include countries such as India, Mexico, Taiwan and Vietnam, in which it hopes to spur the “friendshoring” of production to replace imports that would have come from China. And trade with these allies is rising fast: just 51% of American imports from “low-cost” Asian countries came from China last year, down from 66% when the Trump administration’s first tariffs were introduced five years ago, according to Kearney, a consultancy. The problem is that trade between America’s allies and China is also rising, suggesting that they are often acting as packaging hubs for what, in effect, remain Chinese goods. This flow of products means that, although America may not be buying as much directly from China as before, the two countries’ economies still rely on each other.

中美之间的贸易联系非但没有被削减，反而持续存在——只是形式更加复杂。美国政府首选的贸易伙伴包括印度、墨西哥、台湾和越南等国家，它希望刺激这些国家的生产“友好外包”，以取代来自中国的进口。与这些盟友的贸易正在快速增长：根据科尔尼的数据，去年美国从“低成本”亚洲国家进口的商品中只有 51% 来自中国，低于五年前特朗普政府首次征收关税时的 66%。咨询。问题在于，美国的盟友与中国之间的贸易也在增长，这表明它们经常充当实际上仍然是中国商品的包装中心。这种产品流动意味着，尽管美国可能不再像以前那样直接从中国购买那么多产品，但两国经济仍然相互依赖。

For evidence, look at the countries that benefit from reduced direct Chinese trade with America. Research by Caroline Freund of the University of California, San Diego and co-authors investigates this dynamic. It finds that countries which had the strongest trade relationships with China in a given industry have been the greatest beneficiaries of the redirection of trade, suggesting deep Chinese supply chains still matter enormously to America. This is even truer in categories that include the advanced manufacturing products where American officials are keenest to limit China’s presence. When it comes to these goods, the share of American imports arriving from China declined by 14 percentage points between 2017 and 2022, whereas those from Taiwan and Vietnam—countries that import heavily from China—gained the greatest market share. In short, Chinese activity is still vital to the production of even the most sensitive products.

要寻找证据，请看看哪些国家因中国与美国的直接贸易减少而受益。加州大学圣地亚哥分校的卡罗琳·弗罗因德 (Caroline Freund) 及其合著者的研究调查了这一动态。报告发现，在特定行业中与中国贸易关系最密切的国家是贸易转向的最大受益者，这表明中国深厚的供应链对美国仍然至关重要。在包括美国官员最热衷限制中国存在的先进制造产品在内的类别中更是如此。就这些商品而言，2017年至2022年间，美国从中国进口的商品份额下降了14个百分点，而来自中国台湾和越南等从中国进口大量的国家的商品却获得了最大的市场份额。简而言之，即使是最敏感产品的生产，中国的活动仍然至关重要。

Exactly how the rerouting works in practice differs across countries and industries. A few products can be sourced only in China. These include some processed rare earths and metals where Chinese companies dominate entire industries, such as the gallium used in chip production and the lithium processed for electric-vehicle batteries. Sometimes exports to America and the rest of the West from their allies are nothing more than Chinese products that have been repackaged to avoid tariffs. Most often, though, inputs are simply mechanical or electrical parts that could be found elsewhere at greater cost by an assiduous importer, but are cheaper and more plentiful in China.

在实践中，重新路由的具体运作方式因国家和行业而异。少数产品只能在中国采购。其中包括中国公司主导整个行业的一些加工稀土和金属，例如用于芯片生产的镓和用于电动汽车电池的锂加工。有时，其盟友向美国和其他西方国家出口的只不过是经过重新包装以避免关税的中国产品。不过，最常见的情况是，投入品只是机械或电气零件，勤奋的进口商可以在其他地方以更高的价格找到这些零件，但在中国更便宜、更充足。

Pass the parcel传递包裹

All three types of phoney decoupling can be found in China’s backyard. The latest official data, published in 2018, concerning exports by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (asean), a regional club, show that 7% by value were actually attributable to some form of production in China—a figure that is probably an underestimate, given how difficult it is to disentangle trade. Fresher data suggest that China has only grown in importance since then. The country has increased its share of exports to the bloc in 69 of 97 product categories monitored by asean. Electronic exports, the largest category, which covers everything from batteries and industrial furnaces to hair clippers, have exploded. In the first six months of the year Chinese sales of these goods in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam rose to $49bn, up by 80% compared with five years ago. There is a similar pattern in foreign direct investment, where Chinese spending in crucial South-East Asian countries has overtaken America’s.

这三种虚假脱钩都可以在中国的后院找到。 2018 年发布的关于东南亚国家联盟（东盟）（一个区域俱乐部）出口的最新官方数据显示，按价值计算，7% 实际上归因于中国的某种形式的生产——这一数字可能是考虑到理清贸易关系的难度，这一数字被低估了。最新数据表明，自那时以来，中国的重要性只增不减。在东盟监测的 97 个产品类别中，该国增加了 69 个产品类别对东盟的出口份额。电子产品出口是最大的类别，涵盖从电池、工业炉到理发器的所有产品，出口量呈爆炸式增长。今年前六个月，中国在印度尼西亚、马来西亚、泰国、菲律宾和越南的这些商品销售额增至490亿美元，与五年前相比增长了80%。外国直接投资也有类似的模式，中国在重要东南亚国家的支出已经超过美国。

Factories farther afield are also humming with Chinese activity, perhaps most notably in the car industry. In Mexico the National Association of Autopart Makers, a lobby group, has reported that last year 40% of nearshoring investment came from sites moving to the country from China. A rich supply of intermediate goods is duly following. In the past year Chinese companies exported $300m a month in parts to Mexico, more than twice the amount they managed five years ago. In central and eastern Europe, where the car industry has boomed in recent years, phoney decoupling is even more conspicuous. In 2018 China provided just 3% of automotive parts brought into the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. Since then, Chinese imports have surged, thanks to the rapid adoption of electric vehicles, where the country increasingly dominates production. China now provides 10% of all car parts imported into central and eastern Europe, more than any other country outside the eu.

更远的地方的工厂也充满了中国的活动，也许最引人注目的是汽车行业。在墨西哥，游说团体全国汽车零部件制造商协会报告称，去年 40% 的近岸投资来自从中国迁往该国的工厂。丰富的中间产品供应随之而来。去年，中国企业每月向墨西哥出口价值 3 亿美元的零部件，是五年前出口额的两倍多。在近年来汽车产业蓬勃发展的中东欧，虚假脱钩现象更为突出。 2018年，中国仅提供了捷克共和国、匈牙利、波兰、斯洛伐克、斯洛文尼亚和罗马尼亚汽车零部件的3%。此后，由于电动汽车的迅速普及，中国的进口激增，并且中国在电动汽车的生产中日益占据主导地位。目前，中东欧进口的所有汽车零部件中，有10%是由中国提供的，比欧盟以外的任何其他国家都多。

Tighter trade links between America’s allies and China are the paradoxical result of America’s desire for weaker ones. Firms panicked by worsening relations across the Pacific are pursuing “China plus one” strategies, keeping some production in the world’s second-largest economy, while moving the rest to countries, such as Vietnam, that are friendlier to Uncle Sam. Yet American demand for final products from allies also boosts demand for Chinese intermediate inputs, and produces incentives for Chinese firms to operate and export from alternative places. Although Apple, the world’s largest company by market capitalisation, has moved production outside China in recent years, this comes with a caveat: much of the production still relies on Chinese companies. The tech giant lists 25 producers in Vietnam on its official suppliers list. Nine are from mainland China.

美国盟友与中国之间更紧密的贸易联系是美国渴望弱者的矛盾结果。对太平洋两岸关系恶化感到恐慌的企业正在推行“中国加一”战略，将部分生产保留在世界第二大经济体，同时将其余生产转移到越南等对山姆大叔更友好的国家。然而，美国对盟国最终产品的需求也增加了对中国中间投入的需求，并激励中国企业从其他地方经营和出口。尽管苹果公司是全球市值最大的公司，近年来已将生产转移到中国境外，但这需要注意：大部分生产仍然依赖中国公司。这家科技巨头在其官方供应商名单上列出了 25 家越南生产商。九人来自中国大陆。

How worried should American policymakers be? In the worst-case outcome—a war in which supplies of goods between China and America are almost completely severed—dealing only indirectly with China or with Chinese firms on the soil of third countries is probably an improvement on Chinese production. Moreover, companies are adapting to security rules so as to reduce costs for consumers. But this also carries risks: a belief that decoupling is under way may obscure just how critical Chinese production remains to American supply chains.

美国决策者应该有多担心？在最坏的情况下——一场中美之间的商品供应几乎完全断绝的战争——仅与中国或在第三国领土上的中国企业进行间接交易可能会改善中国的生产。此外，公司正在适应安全规则，以降低消费者的成本。但这也带来了风险：认为脱钩正在进行的信念可能会掩盖中国生产对美国供应链的重要性。

The fact that so much production in Asia, Mexico and parts of Europe ultimately relies on imports and investment from China helps explain why so many governments, particularly in Asia, are at best fair-weather friends to America, at least when it comes to shifting supply chains. If forced to choose between the two countries once and for all, exporters would suffer mightily. A recent study by researchers at the imf models a scenario in which countries must pick between America and China, with their decision on which of the two superpowers to side with determined by recent voting patterns at the un. Such a scenario, the researchers calculate, would reduce gdp by as much as 4.7% for the worst-affected countries. Those in South-East Asia would be struck particularly hard.

亚洲、墨西哥和欧洲部分地区如此多的生产最终依赖于中国的进口和投资，这一事实有助于解释为什么如此多的政府，特别是亚洲国家的政府，充其量只是美国的酒肉朋友，至少在转移经济方面是这样。供应链。如果被迫在两国之间一劳永逸地做出选择，出口商将遭受巨大损失。国际货币基金组织研究人员最近的一项研究模拟了一种情景，各国必须在美国和中国之间做出选择，而它们决定站在这两个超级大国的哪一边取决于联合国最近的投票模式。研究人员计算出，这种情况将使受影响最严重的国家的 GDP 减少多达 4.7%。东南亚国家受到的打击尤其严重。

Given that most countries are desperate for the investment and employment that trade brings, America has been unable to convince its allies to reduce China’s role in their supply chains. Many are content to play both sides—receiving Chinese investment and intermediate goods, and exporting finished products to America and the rest of the West. Ironically, then, the process driving America and China apart in trade and investment may actually be forging stronger financial and commercial connections between China and America’s allies. Needless to say, that is not what President Biden had in mind. ■

鉴于大多数国家都迫切需要贸易带来的投资和就业，美国一直无法说服其盟友减少中国在其供应链中的作用。许多人满足于两面兼顾——接受中国投资和中间产品，并向美国和西方其他国家出口成品。具有讽刺意味的是，美国和中国在贸易和投资方面的分歧实际上可能正在中国和美国的盟友之间建立更牢固的金融和商业联系。不用说，这不是拜登总统的初衷。 ■