America is working to deter China even as it defends Europe from Russia
美国在保护欧洲不受俄罗斯威胁的同时，也在努力威慑中国

Aug 24th 2023 2023年8月24日 经济学人

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The rivalry between great powers involves much jostling over alliances. What does this mean in practice and who is winning? The past month has provided a chance to examine two competing alliance-building efforts. One is the push, led by China, to create a bloc of emerging economies that acts as a counterweight to the West. This was the aim of the brics summit held this week in Johannesburg, attended by Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping, the leaders of India and China. The other is America’s strengthening of its defence network in the Pacific. Of the two efforts, America’s is more convincing.
大国之间的竞争包括许多联盟的争夺。这在实践中意味着什么？谁是赢家？过去的一个月为我们提供了一个审视两个相互竞争的联盟建设努力的机会。一个是以中国为首的新兴经济体集团，以制衡西方。这是本周在约翰内斯堡举行的金砖四国峰会的目标，印度和中国的领导人纳伦德拉·莫迪（Narendra Modi）和习近平都出席了峰会。另一个是美国加强其在太平洋的防御网络。在这两方面的努力中，美国的努力更有说服力。

The gathering of the brics brought together Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The stated goals were to expand the club’s membership and deepen its capabilities in areas such as development lending and financial payments. The event showed a widespread appetite for a less Western world order: six countries were invited to join the brics starting in January 2024, including Argentina, Iran and Saudi Arabia. But it also showed how such a disparate group will struggle to be effective.
金砖四国的聚会汇集了巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非。声明的目标是扩大俱乐部的成员，并深化其在发展贷款和金融支付等领域的能力。这一事件表明，人们普遍希望建立一个不那么西方化的世界秩序：六个国家被邀请从2024年1月开始加入金砖国家，包括阿根廷、伊朗和沙特阿拉伯。但它也表明，这样一个不同的集团将如何努力提高效率。

If the aim is to project common values, it hardly helped that Vladimir Putin had to address the summit by video-link—for fear that the South African hosts would have to enforce a global arrest warrant against him for war crimes. As the group expands, tensions may rise: India fears its influence will be diluted, giving more sway to China. Defence co-operation is probably out of the question. The effort to create a common financial infrastructure (let alone share a currency) looks too ambitious for countries with very different economies and politics. Rather than a body capable of acting widely and consistently in a coordinated way, building global norms and institutions, the brics may end up with a significant but more limited role. Its members may co-operate on narrow issues where they agree, such as rich countries’ obligations in the energy transition, and sometimes act together to attack or try to block Western-led initiatives.
如果目标是传播共同价值观，那么弗拉基米尔·普京不得不通过视频连线在峰会上发表讲话--因为担心南非东道主将不得不以战争罪对他执行全球逮捕令--这一点也于事无补。随着群体的扩大，紧张局势可能会上升：印度担心自己的影响力会被稀释，从而让中国有更多的影响力。防务合作可能是不可能的。建立共同金融基础设施（更不用说共享货币）的努力对于经济和政治截然不同的国家来说过于雄心勃勃。金砖四国最终可能不会成为一个能够以协调一致的方式广泛而一致地采取行动、建立全球规范和制度的机构，而只会发挥重要但有限的作用。它的成员国可能会在他们达成一致的狭窄问题上进行合作，例如富国在能源转型中的义务，有时会联合起来攻击或试图阻止西方领导的倡议。

Contrast that with America’s alliance-building. The war in Ukraine has reinvigorated nato, which has expanded its membership to include Finland and probably Sweden. President Joe Biden has also been working in Asia to counter China. On August 18th he hosted a summit at Camp David with the leaders of Japan and South Korea who, putting aside their old bitterness, agreed to intensify ballistic-missile co-operation and establish a military hotline. Earlier Mr Biden struck deals to let America use more military bases in the Philippines and Papua New Guinea.
与此形成对比的是美国的联盟建设。乌克兰战争使北约重新焕发活力，北约成员国扩大到芬兰，可能还有瑞典。美国总统乔·拜登（Joe Biden）也一直在亚洲努力对抗中国。8月18日，他在大卫主持了一次与日本和韩国领导人的峰会，两国领导人抛开过去的恩怨，同意加强弹道导弹合作，并建立一条军事热线。早些时候，拜登达成协议，允许美国使用更多的菲律宾和巴布亚新几内亚的军事基地。

Meanwhile, the “unbreakable” defence relationship with Australia is deepening, following the aukus agreement struck in March, amid a flurry of equipment deals and military exercises. Should war break out with China, the Aussies seem the most willing to fight at America’s side. Australian land, sea and air bases are expanding to receive more American forces. Under the aukus deal, Australia is gaining its own long-range weapons, such as nuclear-powered (but not nuclear-armed) submarines to be developed jointly with America and Britain. The three partners want to work on other military technologies, from hypersonic missiles to underwater drones.
与此同时，在一系列设备交易和军事演习中，与澳大利亚的“牢不可破”的国防关系正在深化，此前3月份达成了奥库斯协议。如果与中国爆发战争，澳大利亚人似乎最愿意与美国并肩作战。澳大利亚的陆、海、空基地正在扩大，以接收更多的美军。根据aukus协议，澳大利亚正在获得自己的远程武器，例如与美国和英国联合开发的核动力（但不是核武器）潜艇。这三个合作伙伴希望在其他军事技术方面开展合作，从高超音速导弹到水下无人机。

Taken together the “latticework” of security agreements, shows how America’s long-heralded pivot to Asia is accelerating. Mr Biden is proving that America and its allies can deter China (and Russia). More could be done. Congress should agree to sell Virginia-class submarines to Australia in the 2030s as a step to acquiring the aukus subs in the 2040s, and to expand submarine-building capacity. It should waive fiddly restrictions, such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (itar), to make the partners’ defence co-operation seamless.
把这些安全协议的“格子结构”放在一起，可以看出美国长期宣称的转向亚洲的步伐正在加快。拜登正在证明美国及其盟友能够威慑中国（和俄罗斯）。还可以做更多的工作。国会应该同意在21世纪30年代向澳大利亚出售弗吉尼亚级潜艇，作为在21世纪40年代获得奥库斯潜艇的一步，并扩大潜艇建造能力。它应该放弃繁琐的限制，如国际武器贸易条例（itar），以使合作伙伴的国防合作天衣无缝。

These plans still have weaknesses. Mr Biden’s protectionism prevents America from offering an economic counterweight to China, the largest trading partner for most Asian economies. He shows no sign of joining cptpp, a trade pact whose precursor was negotiated by Barack Obama and ditched by Donald Trump. While China complains about an “Asian nato”, there is no mutual commitment by America and its Asian allies to defend each other, let alone go to war over Taiwan. Australia’s government, if it is to sustain bipartisan public support, must also be more candid about the costs of the alliance.
这些计划仍然有弱点。拜登的贸易保护主义使美国无法在经济上与中国抗衡，而中国是大多数亚洲经济体的最大贸易伙伴。他没有表现出加入cptpp的迹象，这是一项贸易协定，其前身是由巴拉克·奥巴马谈判达成的，被唐纳德·特朗普抛弃。当中国抱怨一个“亚洲北约”时，美国和它的亚洲盟友并没有相互保护的承诺，更不用说为台湾开战了。澳大利亚政府如果要维持两党的公众支持，就必须对联盟的成本更加坦率。

Last, if Mr Trump becomes president in 2024, Mr Biden’s rejuvenation of America’s security alliances could yet be undone. All the more reason for America and its allies to keep advancing at speed. The more they can lock into place, and the more Congress can demonstrate that the vision for Asian security is bipartisan, the better for all. The past month shows that America’s network of friendships and alliances is alive and kicking, and that creating competing alternatives will be hard.■
最后，如果特朗普在2024年成为总统，拜登重振美国安全联盟的计划仍可能前功尽弃。这就更有理由让美国及其盟友继续快速前进。他们越能确定，国会越能证明亚洲安全的愿景是两党共同的，对所有人都越好。过去的一个月表明，美国的友谊和联盟网络是活跃的，创造竞争性的替代品将是困难的。

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Mateship reinvented"
这篇文章出现在印刷版的领导者部分，标题是“重新创造的伴侣关系”