Xi Jinping has the tools to escape Japan’s fate. He should use them

习近平拥有摆脱日本命运的工具。他应该利用这些工具

image: reuters 图片：路透社

2023 年 9 月 10 日 经济学人

“Ever since the Chinese housing bubble burst,” said Richard Koo of the Nomura Research Institute in a recent talk, “I’ve been getting tonnes of calls from Chinese journalists, economists, investors and sometimes policymakers asking me, ‘Are we going the way of Japan?’”
"野村综合研究所的理查德-顾（Richard Koo）在最近的一次演讲中说："自从中国房地产泡沫破灭以来，我一直接到大量来自中国记者、经济学家、投资者，有时还有政策制定者的电话，问我'我们会走日本的老路吗？

Mr Koo is a good person to ask: he has devoted his career to studying the aftermath of financial excess. When the American economy’s recovery from the first Gulf War faltered in 1991, his then boss at the New York Federal Reserve, Edward Frydl, began to worry about an overhang of debt and commercial property. This was “feeding a pervasive financial and economic conservatism among businesses and consumers”, Frydl argued. Demand for credit was subdued, because firms were “directing their efforts toward balance-sheet restructuring”. To describe these strains, he coined the term “balance-sheet recession”.
顾先生是一个很好的询问对象：他的职业生涯致力于研究金融过度的后果。1991 年，当美国经济在第一次海湾战争后复苏乏力时，他当时在纽约联邦储备委员会的上司爱德华-弗莱德尔（Edward Frydl）开始担心债务和商业地产过剩的问题。弗莱德尔认为，这 "助长了企业和消费者中普遍存在的金融和经济保守主义"。信贷需求受到抑制，因为企业正在 "努力进行资产负债表重组"。为了描述这些压力，他创造了 "资产负债表衰退 "一词。

Mr Koo later realised that Japan was suffering from the same overhangs, only far worse. After its stockmarket bubble burst in 1989, share prices plunged by 60% in less than three years. Property prices in Tokyo fell for over a decade. Deflation, by some measures, persisted even longer. Even the price of golf memberships—tradeable on organised exchanges in Japan—tumbled by 94%. Many companies, which had borrowed to buy property or shares in other firms, found themselves technically insolvent, with assets worth less than liabilities. But they remained liquid, earning enough revenue to meet ongoing obligations. With survival at stake, they redirected their efforts from maximising profit to minimising debt, as Mr Koo put it.
顾先生后来意识到，日本也面临着同样的问题，只不过要严重得多。1989 年股市泡沫破灭后，股价在不到三年的时间里暴跌了 60%。东京的房地产价格下跌了十多年。从某些角度看，通货紧缩持续的时间更长。即使是在日本有组织的交易所交易的高尔夫会员卡的价格也暴跌了 94%。许多借债购买房产或其他公司股份的公司发现自己在技术上已经资不抵债，资产价值低于负债价值。但它们仍然保持流动性，赚取足够的收入来履行持续的债务。正如顾先生所说，由于生存受到威胁，它们将努力方向从利润最大化转向债务最小化。

In a healthy economy, corporations use funds provided by households and other savers, ploughing the money into growing their businesses. In post-bubble Japan, things looked different. Instead of raising funds, the corporate sector began to repay debts and accumulate financial claims of its own. Its traditional financial deficit turned to a chronic financial surplus. Corporate inhibition robbed the economy of much-needed demand and entrepreneurial vigour, condemning it to a deflationary decade or two.
在健康的经济中，企业利用家庭和其他储蓄者提供的资金，将其投入到业务增长中。在泡沫经济后的日本，情况有所不同。企业部门非但没有筹集资金，反而开始偿还债务，积累自己的金融债权。传统的财政赤字变成了长期的财政盈余。企业的抑制剥夺了经济急需的需求和创业活力，使其陷入十年或二十年的通货紧缩。

So is China going the way of Japan? Chinese enterprises have accumulated even more debt, relative to the size of the country’s gdp, than Japan’s did in its bubble era. China’s house prices have begun to fall, damaging the balance-sheets of households and property firms. Credit growth has slowed sharply, despite cuts in interest rates. And flow-of-funds statistics show a narrowing in the financial deficit of China’s corporations in recent years. In Mr Koo’s judgment, China is already in a balance-sheet recession. Add to that a declining population and a hostile America and it is easy to be gloomy: will it go the way of Japan? It should be so lucky.
那么，中国会走日本的老路吗？与日本的泡沫经济时代相比，中国企业积累的债务相对于该国的国民生产总值而言甚至更多。中国的房价开始下跌，损害了家庭和房地产公司的资产负债表。尽管利率下调，信贷增长仍大幅放缓。而资金流动统计数据显示，近年来中国企业的财务赤字有所收窄。辜先生认为，中国已经陷入资产负债表衰退。再加上人口减少和美国的敌视，很容易让人产生悲观情绪：中国会走日本的老路吗？中国应该感到庆幸。

Look closer, though, and the case is less conclusive. Much of the debt incurred by China’s corporations is owed by state-owned enterprises that will continue to borrow and spend, with the support of state-owned banks, if required by China’s policymakers. Among private enterprises, debt is concentrated on the books of property developers. They are reducing their liabilities and cutting back on investment in new housing projects. But in the face of falling property prices and weak housing sales, even developers with robust balance-sheets would be doing the same.
不过，再仔细看看，情况就不那么确凿了。中国企业的大部分债务是国有企业欠下的，如果中国决策者需要，这些企业将在国有银行的支持下继续借贷和消费。在私营企业中，债务主要集中在房地产开发商的账面上。它们正在减少负债，削减对新住房项目的投资。但面对房地产价格下跌和住房销售疲软，即使是资产负债表稳健的开发商也会采取同样的做法。

The end of China’s property boom has made households less wealthy. This is presumably breeding conservatism in their spending. It is also true that households have repaid mortgages early in recent months, contributing to the sharp slowdown in credit growth. But surveys show that household debts are low relative to their assets. Their mortgage prepayments are a rational response to changing interest rates, not a sign of balance-sheet stress. When interest rates fall in China, households cannot easily refinance their mortgages at the lower rates. It therefore makes sense for them to repay old, relatively expensive mortgages, even if that means redeeming investments that now offer lower yields.
中国房地产繁荣期的结束使得家庭财富减少。这大概会滋生他们在消费方面的保守主义。近几个月来，家庭提前偿还抵押贷款，导致信贷增长急剧放缓，这也是事实。但调查显示，相对于资产而言，家庭负债较低。他们提前偿还抵押贷款是对利率变化的理性反应，而不是资产负债表紧张的迹象。当中国利率下降时，家庭不容易以较低的利率对抵押贷款进行再融资。因此，对他们来说，偿还相对昂贵的旧房贷是合理的，即使这意味着要赎回现在收益率较低的投资。

What about the switch in corporate behaviour revealed by China’s flow-of-funds statistics, which show the corporate sector moving to a financial surplus? This narrowing is largely driven by the crackdown on shadow banks, points out Xiaoqing Pi and her colleagues at Bank of America. When financial institutions are excluded, the corporate sector is still demanding funds from the rest of the economy. Chinese businesses have not made the collectively self-defeating switch from maximising profits to minimising debts that condemned Japan to a deflationary decade.
中国的资金流向统计数据显示，企业部门正在向财政盈余转变，那么企业行为的转变又是怎么回事呢？皮小卿和她在美国银行的同事指出，这种收窄主要是受打击影子银行的影响。如果将金融机构排除在外，企业部门仍然需要从其他经济部门获得资金。中国企业并没有像日本那样，从利润最大化转向债务最小化，从而导致通货紧缩十年。

Japanese lessons 日本的教训

These differences show China is not yet in a recession akin to Japan’s. And Mr Koo is himself keen to emphasise one “huge” difference between the two countries. When Japan was falling into a balance-sheet recession, nobody in the country had a name for the problem or an idea of how to fight it. Today, he says, many Chinese economists are studying his ideas.
这些差异表明，中国尚未陷入与日本类似的经济衰退。辜胜阻先生本人也热衷于强调两国之间的一个 "巨大 "差异。当日本陷入资产负债表衰退时，国内没有人知道这个问题的名称，也没有人知道如何解决这个问题。他说，如今，许多中国经济学家正在研究他的想法。

His prescription is straightforward. If households and firms will not borrow and spend even at low interest rates, then the government will have to do so instead. Fiscal deficits must offset the financial surpluses of the private sector until their balance-sheets are fully repaired. If Xi Jinping, China’s ruler, gets the right advice, he can fix the problem in 20 minutes, Mr Koo has said.
他开出的药方直截了当。如果家庭和企业即使在低利率下也不愿意借贷和消费，那么政府就必须这样做。财政赤字必须抵消私营部门的财政盈余，直到它们的资产负债表完全修复。辜胜阻先生说，如果中国领导人习近平得到正确的建议，他可以在 20 分钟内解决这个问题。

Unfortunately, Chinese officials have so far been slow to react. The country’s budget deficit, broadly defined to include various kinds of local-government borrowing, has tightened this year, worsening the downturn. The central government has room to borrow more, but seems reluctant to do so, preferring to keep its powder dry. This is a mistake. If the government spends late, it will probably have to spend more. It is ironic that China risks slipping into a prolonged recession not because the private sector is intent on cleaning up its finances, but because the central government is unwilling to get its own balance-sheet dirty enough. ■
遗憾的是，中国官员至今反应迟缓。中国的预算赤字（广义上包括各种地方政府借贷）今年有所收紧，加剧了经济下滑。中央政府有更多的举债空间，但似乎不愿这样做，宁愿保持干劲。这是一个错误。如果政府迟花钱，就可能不得不花更多的钱。具有讽刺意味的是，中国之所以有可能陷入长期衰退，并不是因为私营部门有意清理其财务，而是因为中央政府不愿意把自己的资产负债表弄得太脏。■